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VISA DENIED:  WHY COURTS SHOULD 
REVIEW A CONSULAR OFFICER’S DENIAL 
OF A U.S.-CITIZEN FAMILY MEMBER’S VISA 
GABRIELA BACA 
Before entering the United States for permanent or temporary residence, most 
noncitizens must complete a series of administrative procedures and 
background checks.  The final step in the process is an interview with a 
consular officer in the noncitizen’s home country.  That step, in most cases, 
determines whether a spouse can permanently rejoin her U.S.-citizen husband 
or wife in the United States or whether another immediate family member can 
permanently reside in the same home as her U.S.-citizen family member.  After 
a consular officer decides to admit or deny entry to a noncitizen family 
member, there are limited opportunities for administrative or judicial review of 
the consular officer’s decision. 
For decades, federal courts have adhered to the doctrine of consular 
nonreviewability to limit judicial review of a consular officer’s visa decision.  
This doctrine, rooted in the legislative and the executive branches’ plenary 
power over immigration matters, first emerged in Kleindienst v. Mandel.  
Since then, federal courts have interpreted the doctrine—in some instances 
limiting the doctrine’s reach, and in others, allowing for more judicial review.  
                                                          
  Senior Symposium Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 64; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2015, American University Washington College of Law; B.S., Foreign 
Service, May 2008, Georgetown University.  I owe a special thanks to my colleagues on 
the American University Law Review for their immensely valuable contributions and 
edits.  I am deeply grateful to Professor Amanda Frost for her insightful feedback as 
my faculty advisor and to Professor Jayesh Rathod for first discussing this issue with 
me.  Most importantly, I thank my parents for their love and encouragement.  
Finally, I dedicate this piece to Matthew Appenfeller, whose enduring support and 
thoughtful advice led to the successful publication of this Comment. 
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In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Din v. Kerry, a U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision, which held that a visa denial 
impinges on a U.S. citizen’s constitutionally protected interest in her marriage 
to a noncitizen spouse. 
Without the opportunity for either an administrative appeal or judicial 
review of a visa denial, a single consular officer can force a U.S. citizen, like 
Mrs. Din, to live apart from her closest family member or to relinquish a stable 
life and employment in the United States to move abroad with her noncitizen 
family member.  This Comment argues that the visa denial of a U.S. citizen’s 
family member implicates that citizen’s fundamental Fifth Amendment due 
process rights—therefore allowing judicial review of the denial—because the 
Supreme Court has long recognized the liberty interests involved in marriage 
and in living with one’s immediate and extended family. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this scenario:  a U.S. citizen accurately and timely files all 
of the required paperwork for her foreign spouse to permanently 
immigrate to the United States.  The U.S. government approves the 
visa two years later.  Several weeks after the approval, at a U.S. 
consular office overseas, a consular officer denies her spouse’s visa.  
The embassy and the consular officer refuse to provide a reason for 
the denial.  Without this information, the U.S. citizen and her spouse 
will not have an opportunity to contest the consular officer’s decision, 
and they also will not have an opportunity to seek administrative or 
judicial review.  As a result of the consular officer’s visa decision, the 
U.S. citizen and her spouse will remain separated without recourse. 
This is Fauzia Din’s story.  In 2006, Din, a U.S. citizen, married 
Kanishka Berashk, a citizen and resident of Afghanistan.1  Shortly 
after their marriage, she submitted an I-130 visa petition to U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the U.S. government 
agency responsible for visa adjudications, so that Berashk could 
permanently immigrate to the United States.2  A year and a half after 
filing the visa petition, USCIS informed Din that the agency approved 
her visa petition for Berashk.3  As part of the visa process, USCIS 
forwarded the approved visa petition to the National Visa Center 
                                                          
 1. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  The process of filing the petition with USCIS, receiving notification, and 
interviewing at a consular post can be lengthy.  Din submitted a visa petition for 
Berashk in October 2006.  Id.  USCIS approved the visa petition on February 12, 
2008.  Id.  The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan scheduled Berashk’s consular 
interview for September 9, 2008.  Id.  Nine months after the interview, on June 7, 
2009, Berashk received a letter informing him that his visa had been denied.  Id. at 859. 
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(NVC) for processing and then on to the U.S. Department of State’s 
(State Department or DOS) consular post in Pakistan, where a 
consular officer interviewed Berashk to issue his visa.4 
Two years after Din first submitted Berashk’s visa petition to 
USCIS, the consular officer asked Berashk during the consular 
interview about his work for the Afghan Ministry of Social Welfare 
during the period in which the Taliban controlled the country.5  The 
consular officer, suggesting that he had approved the visa, told 
Berashk that he would receive the visa in two to six weeks.6  Nine 
months later, the Embassy notified Berashk that it denied his visa 
based on section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) and that there were no waivers available to overcome his 
ineligibility for a visa.7  Unsure of the specific reasons for the denial, 
Din and Berashk sought an explanation from the Embassy.8  The 
Embassy responded that the consular officer denied Berashk’s visa 
under section 212(a)(3)(B), a provision of the INA that bars 
admission into the United States for terrorist-related activities.9  
Neither Din nor Berashk received further explanation for the denial 
because INA section 212(b) exempts denials based on INA section 
212(a)(2)–(3) from the requirement that the government explain 
the basis for the denials.10  After further requests to the Embassy and 
                                                          
 4. Id. at 858; see also The Immigrant Visa Process, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://travel.state.gov/ 
content/visas/english/immigrate/immigrant-process.html (last visited Feb. 28, 
2015) (diagramming all of the steps a U.S. citizen must complete after he or she 
submits a visa petition to USCIS).  The case did not specify why Berashk visited the 
Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan instead of the Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. 
 5. Din, 718 F.3d at 858. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 859.  Known as the grounds for inadmissibility, section 212(a) of the 
INA is a broad provision that includes all of the grounds that could bar a foreign 
citizen from entering the United States.  See Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952, Pub. L. No. 92-414, § 212(a), 66 Stat. 163, 182–87 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012)) (listing ten broad provisions for inadmissibility, each 
specifying dozens of specific acts that could make a person inadmissible).  Because 
Berashk’s visa denial did not provide a specific ground, the consular officer could 
have denied Berashk’s visa on any one of the grounds listed in the provision, 
including for health- or security-related reasons, among others. 
 8. Din, 718 F.3d at 859. 
 9. Id.  Section 212(a)(3) of the INA is one of ten subcategories under section 
212(a) that lists grounds of inadmissibility.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).  Section 212(a)(3) 
includes “security and related grounds” with subparagraphs describing activities 
related to terrorism, foreign policy, or totalitarian party membership that bar a 
noncitizen’s admission into the United States.  Id. § 1182(a)(3)(A)–(D). 
 10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3) (stating that visas denied under section 212(a)(2)–
(3) of the INA are not subject to the notice requirements of INA section 212(b)(1), 
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to the Office of Visa Services at the State Department, Din and 
Berashk received the same response:  the U.S. government would not 
provide additional facts or reasons for the denial.11  Without the facts 
underlying the denial, Din and Berashk could not challenge the 
decision or present evidence to overcome Berashk’s ineligibility. 
Each year, the State Department, through its overseas consular 
officers, denies millions of visas.12  The visas denied range from 
nonimmigrant tourist or business visas to family-reunification 
immigrant visas, such as Berashk’s immediate relative visa.13  After a 
multi-step process with an array of U.S. government agencies, U.S. 
consular officers overseas provide the final stamp of approval or 
denial before a foreign national can travel to the United States.14  For 
U.S.-citizen petitioners, visa beneficiaries, and immigration 
practitioners, Din and Berashk’s scenario is all too common:  a U.S. 
consular officer denies a visa without any real explanation, and the 
                                                          
which require a consular officer to provide the applicant with timely written notice of 
the consular officer’s findings and the provision under which denial is based). 
 11. Din, 718 F.3d at 859. 
 12. In fiscal year 2012, the most recent year for which complete data is available, 
the State Department issued a combined total of 9,409,390 immigrant and 
nonimmigrant visas.  BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF 
THE VISA OFFICE 2012 tbl.I (2012), available at http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/ 
english/law-and-policy/statistics/annual-reports/report-of-the-visa-office-2012.html 
[hereinafter BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, 2012 REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE].  Of 
those immigrant visas issued in fiscal year 2012, 235,616 were immediate relative visas 
and 189,128 were family-sponsored visas.  Id. 
In contrast, DOS refused a combined total of 2,443,984 immigrant and 
nonimmigrant visas.  Id. tbl.XX.  Applicants may overcome a refusal by (1) providing 
evidence that an inadmissibility ground did not apply, (2) successfully applying for a 
waiver, or (3) receiving another form of relief.  Id. at n.2.  Of the 311,835 immigrant 
visas denied because a consular officer found that an INA ground of ineligibility 
applied, 215,321 applicants overcame their ineligibility.  Id.  Of the 76 applicants 
found ineligible for a visa under INA section 212(a)(3)(B) for “terrorist activities,” 
no applicant overcame his or her ineligibility.  Id.  Similarly, of the 223 applicants 
found ineligible for a visa under section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii), the provision covering 
applicants who have engaged in “other unlawful activity,” no applicant overcame his 
or her ineligibility.  Id.  By comparison, all visa applicants who were ineligible for a 
visa under section 212(a)(4), the provision barring a noncitizen who may become a 
public charge, overcame their ineligibility.  Id. 
 13. See id. at tbl.xx (detailing the specific grounds under which consular officers 
denied immigrant and nonimmigrant visas in fiscal year 2012). 
 14. See The Immigrant Visa Process, supra note 4 (detailing the steps involved in 
securing a visa).  But see Administrative Processing Information, U.S. DEP’T ST., 
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/general/administrative-processing-
information.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (indicating that some applicants will 
need to undergo “further administrative processing,” which can take up to sixty days). 
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U.S. citizen loses a long-awaited opportunity to reunite with a foreign 
family member.  This scenario becomes more pressing for U.S.-
citizen family members who have waited decades to nurture a family, 
share intimacy, or establish familial bonds with a family member from 
whom they have been separated. 
Without any formal recourse, the U.S.-citizen petitioner, the visa 
beneficiary, and the immigration lawyer are left wondering why the 
consular officer denied the application despite USCIS’s approval of 
the petition.15  The State Department does not have a formal review 
or appeals process for denied visas, and federal courts generally 
refuse to grant jurisdiction to visa beneficiaries who seek review of a 
visa denial.16  This practice, known as consular absolutism or consular 
nonreviewability, is deeply rooted in the legislative and the executive 
branches’ plenary power over immigration matters.17  Therefore, 
                                                          
 15. See, e.g., Sharon R. Muse, The Need for Review of Consular Decisions in Visa 
Determinations, 13 ADELPHIA L.J. 111, 118–19  (2000) (describing the informal 
procedures available to visa petitioners and beneficiaries, such as an optional 
advisory opinion on a consulate’s interpretation of the law); Abraham D. Sofaer, 
Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 
1293, 1363 (1972) (criticizing the authority the law grants consular officers to make 
final, generally unreviewable immigration decisions because it allows them to 
“arbitrarily and whimsically issue or deny visas”). 
 16. See James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 16–25 (1991) (providing an overview of consular officials’ “[i]nformal and 
non-reviewed decisionmaking”); Leon Wildes, Review of Visa Denials:  The American 
Consul as 20th Century Absolute Monarch, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 887, 888 (1989) 
(criticizing a consular officer’s “unbridled power” to issue visas); infra Part I.A 
(noting that U.S. citizens and applicants who do not receive notice of the reason 
their visas have been denied generally have no recourse). 
 17. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972) (explaining 
Congress’s plenary power over immigrant admission and exclusion decisions, but 
noting that Congress has delegated some of its authority in this area to the executive 
branch).  In Mandel, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the judiciary’s inability 
to scrutinize a consular officer’s decision is based on decades of precedent 
reaffirming the executive and legislative branches’ power in the immigration realm.  
See id. at 766 (insisting that Congress’s immigration policy is “enforced exclusively 
through executive officers, without judicial intervention,” and that this practice “is 
settled by our previous adjudications” (quoting Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 
U.S. 538, 547 (1895))); see also United States ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288, 
290 (2d Cir. 1927) (holding that there is no formal administrative or judicial review 
of consular decisions); Nafziger, supra note 16, at 16 (acknowledging that section 
104(a) of the INA makes visa denials controversial because the section is often cited 
as curtailing administrative review); Note, Judicial Review of Visa Denials:  Reexamining 
Consular Nonreviewability, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1137, 1155 (1977) (criticizing the 
Supreme Court’s cases involving consular nonreviewability as “divin[ing] from the 
power to set policy concerning alien entries, a power to implement that policy free 
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once a consular officer makes a visa decision, it is unlikely that a 
court or a reviewing officer will reverse the decision.18 
Yet, in some instances, courts can engage in a limited review of a 
visa denial, despite the prevalence of consular nonreviewability.19  In 
1972, in Kleindienst v. Mandel,20 the Supreme Court first identified the 
possibility of an exception to consular nonreviewability when it 
reviewed a visa waiver denial because the denial implicated the First 
Amendment rights of U.S.-citizen professors.21  The Court limited 
review to a determination of whether the government or the consular 
officer provided a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the 
visa denial.22 
Courts have interpreted Mandel to create an exception to consular 
nonreviewability, but they disagree about when a U.S.-citizen 
                                                          
from all judicial scrutiny,” and observing that such “reasoning has persisted . . . 
despite the evolution of a common law presumption in favor of judicial review, the 
codification of that presumption in the [Administrative Procedure Act], and 
independent developments in the area of procedural due process”); Maria Zas, 
Comment, Consular Absolutism:  The Need for Judicial Review in the Adjudication of 
Immigrant Visas for Permanent Residence, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 577, 588 (2004) 
(discussing how the doctrine of consular absolutism “immunizes” consular officers 
from judicial review).  Section 104(a) of the INA suggests that the Secretary of State 
does not have the power to administratively review consular officers’ decisions.  
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 92-414, § 104(a), 66 Stat. 163, 
174–75 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2012)). 
 18. See infra text accompanying note 22 (discussing Mandel’s limited standard of 
review).  Under Mandel, a court can review a consular officer’s decision only to 
determine whether there was a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the visa 
denial.  Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770; see also Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417, 428 
n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that a consular officer’s decision cannot be reversed 
because the decision will not be reviewed). 
 19. See, e.g., Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770 (finding that if a consular officer offers a 
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for a denial, then a court will not “look 
behind” the consular officer’s discretion); see also Wildes, supra note 16, at 898 
(conceding that Mandel offers a “minimal standard of judicial scrutiny” but noting 
that the decision was a “significant departure” from earlier cases that “complete[ly] 
abdicat[ed]” all judicial review of an immigration officer’s discretion). 
 20. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
 21. See id. at 754, 770 (holding that “when the Executive exercises this power 
negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will 
[not] look behind the exercise of that discretion”).  Implicitly, by granting certiorari 
to the issue, the Supreme Court suggested that when a U.S. citizen’s First 
Amendment rights may be implicated, a consular officer’s decision must be “facially 
legitimate and bona fide.”  Id. at 770. 
 22. Id. at 770. 
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petitioner can seek review under this exception.23  For example, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bustamante v. Mukasey24 
and in Din v. Kerry25 acknowledged that a foreign spouse’s visa denial 
implicates the fundamental marital and familial rights of a U.S. 
citizen such that Mandel’s limited review applied.26  Other courts, 
nevertheless, refuse to find that a visa denial implicates such 
fundamental rights and do not apply Mandel review.27  When faced 
with a visa denial claim, some federal courts either erroneously apply 
the doctrine of consular nonreviewability or interpret Mandel in a 
manner contradictory to longstanding Supreme Court precedent 
defending the fundamental right to freedom of personal choice in 
matters of marriage and family life, the right to live with immediate 
and extended family, and the constitutional due process protections 
afforded to U.S. citizens. 
This Comment argues that the visa denial of a U.S. citizen’s family 
member implicates that citizen’s fundamental Fifth Amendment due 
process rights—therefore allowing judicial review of the denial—
because the Supreme Court has long recognized the liberty interests 
involved in marriage and in living with one’s immediate and 
extended family.  Without the opportunity for either an 
administrative appeal or judicial review of a visa denial, a single 
consular officer can force a U.S. citizen, like Din, to live apart from 
her closest family member or to relinquish a stable life and 
employment in the United States to move abroad with her family 
member.  An erroneous or unjustified visa denial, perhaps with a 
pretextual reason underlying the decision, could disintegrate a family 
and lead to financial and emotional hardship for the U.S.-citizen 
petitioner.  Allowing judicial review of visa denials would not entitle a 
foreign citizen to entry into the United States, nor would it afford a 
U.S. citizen the right to have his or her foreign family member enter 
                                                          
 23. Compare Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 554, 557 (2d Cir. 
1975) (denying standing to a U.S.-citizen spouse and asserting consular 
nonreviewability over a visa review claim), with Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 
1059, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that a U.S. citizen had standing to seek 
review of her foreign spouse’s visa denial because the denial implicated the U.S. 
citizen’s fundamental right to “[f]reedom of personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life”). 
 24. 531 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 25. 718 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014). 
 26. Id. at 868; Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1061–62. 
 27. See infra Part I.B.2 (providing an overview of cases that do and do not 
recognize that the denial of a U.S. citizen’s foreign spouse’s visa implicates that 
citizen’s protected liberty interests, thus triggering Mandel review (or not)). 
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the United States.  Rather, judicial review of these visas would allow a 
U.S.-citizen petitioner to receive due process protections when a 
government action infringes on the fundamental rights of a U.S. 
citizen.  Moreover, the fundamental rights implicated by the denial of 
a family member’s visa involve higher stakes than those involved in 
Mandel, when the Court implicitly accepted that U.S.-citizen 
professors could seek review of a foreign professor’s visa waiver denial. 
Part I provides an overview of the steps involved in securing an 
immediate relative and a family-sponsored immigrant visa.  It then 
examines the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, discusses the 
Mandel exception to nonreviewability, and provides an overview of 
federal court decisions interpreting Mandel.  This Part also 
summarizes Supreme Court precedent affirming the individual 
liberty interests present in marriage and in the right to live together 
as a family.  Part II analyzes how federal courts have expanded 
Mandel’s scope.  Part II also examines how Supreme Court decisions 
upholding the liberty interests in marriage and in the right to live 
together as a family bolster judicial review for family reunification 
visas.  This Comment concludes that the Supreme Court should 
follow the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Mandel in Bustamante and 
Din and allow a U.S.-citizen petitioner to seek review of a spouse’s or 
family member’s visa denial because a consular officer’s visa denial 
implicates that U.S. citizen’s fundamental marital and familial rights. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part provides an overview of the procedures involved in 
securing an immediate relative and family-sponsored immigrant visa.  
It also discusses the origins of the doctrine of consular 
nonreviewability.  After discussing the Mandel exception to 
nonreviewability, this Part also provides an overview of federal court 
decisions that have applied Mandel review.  Finally, this Part 
summarizes the Supreme Court’s decisions recognizing the 
fundamental rights involved in marital and familial relationships and 
in living with one’s extended family. 
A. Overview of Visa Adjudication and Consular Officer Procedures 
Family members of U.S. citizens are eligible for one of two types of 
family reunification visas:  an immediate relative or a family-
sponsored visa.  A U.S. citizen’s spouse, parents, adopted orphan 
children, and unmarried children under the age of twenty-one are 
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eligible for an immediate relative visa.28  Immediate relatives are 
exempt from the statutory provisions that limit the annual number of 
immigrants that can enter the United States from a specific visa 
category.29  Thus, an immediate relative can enter the United States 
as soon as a consular officer approves his or her visa.  To qualify for a 
family-sponsored immigrant visa, a noncitizen must fall into one of 
four categories specified in the INA: (1) unmarried sons and 
daughters of U.S. citizens, (2) spouses and unmarried sons and 
daughter of legal permanent residents (LPRs), (3) married sons and 
daughters of U.S. citizens, and (4) brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens 
if the citizens are over the age of twenty-one.30  Family-sponsored 
immigrant visas, however, are subject to strict statutory provisions that 
limit the number of visas that may be issued each year.31 
The procedures for filing an immediate relative visa petition and a 
family-sponsored visa petition are similar.32  First, the U.S. citizen, 
                                                          
 28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (defining “immediate relatives” as the 
parents, spouse, and child of a U.S. citizen).  U.S. citizens who petition for their 
parents must be at least twenty-one years old at the time they file their applications.  
Id.  Children petitioned by U.S.-citizen parents must be under the age of twenty-one 
and unmarried.  Id. § 1101(b)(1)(E).  An orphan child adopted abroad and an 
orphan to be adopted in the United States by a U.S. citizen is also eligible for an 
immediate relative visa.  Id. § 1101(b)(1)(F). 
 29. See id. § 1151(b) (listing and describing the immigrant categories that are not 
subject to annual visa limitations, including immediate relatives). 
 30. See id. § 1153(a) (describing the four subcategories of family-sponsored visas 
and the number of visas annually allocated to each subcategory). 
 31. See generally id. § 1151(c) (detailing the number of family-sponsored visas that 
may be issued each fiscal year).  The annual limit of family-sponsored visas is 480,000 
minus the number of immediate relatives who were admitted in the preceding fiscal 
year plus any employment-based visas that were available but unused during the 
preceding fiscal year.  Id. 
 32. The primary difference between an immediate relative and family-sponsored 
visa is that family-sponsored visas are subject to annual numerical limitations.  See 
supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (distinguishing between immediate 
relative and family-sponsored visas); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 (2014) (providing an 
overview of the processes for obtaining immediate relative and family-sponsored 
visas).  A family-sponsored visa applicant has to wait until a visa becomes available on 
the Department of State’s Visa Bulletin because of the annual visa limitations.  Visa 
Bulletin:  Immigrant Numbers for March 2014, U.S. DEP’T ST. 1 (Feb. 7, 2014), 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_march2014.pdf.  
The Visa Bulletin indicates from which dates of visa submissions the State 
Department is processing visas.  Id.  USCIS will issue visa applicants a “priority date” 
that indicates the date on which the application was filed.  Id.  Each month, the Visa 
Bulletin reflects the priority date from which the Department of State is processing 
visas.  See id.  For example, if the Visa Bulletin lists August 15, 2001, then the State 
Department is processing visas submitted to USCIS on that date.  See id. at 2.  If an 
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commonly referred to as the petitioner, must submit an I-130 form—
the visa petition—to USCIS on behalf of the noncitizen, who is often 
called the beneficiary or intending immigrant.33  The I-130 
establishes the claimed relationship between the petitioner and the 
beneficiary.  Next, after USCIS receives and approves the visa 
petition, USCIS sends the visa petition to the State Department’s 
National Visa Center.34  After processing the visa petition, the NVC 
sends the petition to a consular post in the beneficiary’s home 
country where the beneficiary must interview with a consular officer 
to receive final approval of the visa.35  Together, these procedures 
may take several years.36  In the case of a family-sponsored immigrant 
who is subject to annual visa limitations, the process may be even 
longer because the applicant has to wait for a visa to become available.37 
The interview with a consular officer is the last step in the series of 
administrative procedures.  The consular officer can approve the visa, 
request more information from the applicant, or deny the visa.38  If a 
consular officer denies a visa, the consular officer must inform the 
denied applicant of the legal provisions under which the denial is 
                                                          
applicant submits an application this year for that same category, the applicant will 
have to wait almost thirteen years for the State Department to process the visa.  Id. 
 33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (describing the procedures U.S. petitioners and visa 
beneficiaries need to complete to file a visa application). 
 34. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(iii)(F)(3) (noting that after USCIS approves the visa 
petition, USCIS forwards the approved petition to the NVC); see also The Immigrant 
Visa Process, supra note 4 (showing the steps a U.S. citizen must complete after he or 
she submits a visa petition to USCIS). 
 35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (“[A] consular officer may issue . . . to an 
immigrant who has made proper application therefor, an immigrant visa which shall 
consist of the application provided for in section 1202 . . . .”). 
 36. See Suzy Khimm, How Long Is the Immigration “Line”?  As Long as 24 Years., 
WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ 
wp/2013/01/31/how-long-is-the-immigration-line-as-long-as-24-years (describing the 
long wait times for visas as a result of bureaucratic delays as well as noting, for 
example, that the visa wait time for a person from Mexico can exceed fifteen years). 
 37. See Visa Bulletin:  Immigrant Numbers for March 2014, supra note 32, at 2 
(showing that the siblings of a U.S.-citizen petitioner from the Philippines will have 
to wait nearly twenty-four years for their visas to become available whereas the spouse 
or child of a legal permanent resident will have to wait only six months). 
 38. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(iii)(F)(3) (detailing how the State Department will 
decide on petitions); 22 C.F.R. § 42.81 (explaining the State Department’s visa 
refusal procedure); see also The Immigrant Visa Process:  After the Interview, U.S. DEP’T ST., 
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/immigrant-process/interview/ 
after.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (instructing applicants on how to proceed after 
their petitions have been approved or denied and noting that, for a visa denial, 
additional administrative processing is sometimes required to conclude the 
application process). 
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based and must provide a factual basis for the visa denial in writing.39  
An exception to this rule exists for those visas denied under INA 
section 212(a)(2)–(3), the criminal and security-related 
inadmissibility provisions.40  State Department regulations provide 
that consular officers must send denied applications to a supervisory 
officer within the consulate designated to review denials.41  The 
supervisory officer must then review the case and affirm or reverse 
the decision no later than thirty days after the consular officer made 
her initial decision.42 
In practice, it is unclear if these procedures actually occur.43  The 
Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), the State Department’s organizational 
                                                          
 39. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b); see also 22 C.F.R. § 42.81 (stating that if a consular 
officer denies a visa, he or she must have a basis in either INA section 212(a), 
which lists the grounds of inadmissibility; INA section 221(g), which concerns 
missing documents; or another applicable law).  All visa denials must conform to 
22 C.F.R. § 40.6, which provides: 
A visa can be refused only upon a ground specifically set out in the law or 
implementing regulations.  The term “reason to believe,” as used in INA 221(g), 
shall be considered to require a determination based upon facts or 
circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the 
applicant is ineligible to receive a visa as provided in the INA and as 
implemented by the regulations. 
22 C.F.R. § 40.6 (emphasis added).  See generally Nafziger, supra note 16, at 20–21 
(discussing the State Department’s internal review procedures). 
 40. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3). 
 41. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 42.81 n.1.2 (2008) 
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FAM].  The Foreign Affairs Manual consists of 
internal organizational policies that have some practical binding effect on State 
Department officials.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 1111.1 
(2013) (stating that the FAM includes “procedures and policies . . . relating to 
[State] Department management and personnel” which “derive their authority from 
statutes, Executive orders, . . . and Department policies”).  It is, however, unlikely 
that a court would find a document like this legally binding in a suit from a member 
of the public against a State Department employee for failure to comply.  See Email 
from Jeffrey Lubbers, Professor, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, to Gabriela Baca (Feb. 
20, 2014, 12:34 a.m. EST) (on file with author). 
 42. See 22 CFR § 42.81(c) (requiring the review occur “without delay”); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FAM, supra note 41, at 42.81 n.1.2 (providing the 
thirty-day requirement). 
 43. See Nafziger, supra note 16, at 94–95 (stating that regulations require senior 
consular officers to review visa denials, but admitting that the “high volume of 
applications at some posts [has] resulted in review of only a random sample of 
denials”).  Budgetary constraints may also hinder the adequacy of informal 
procedures.  See id. at 58 (noting that consular officers have limited time to detail the 
reasons for a visa denial and observing that a supervisory officer reviewing an 
informal administrative appeal of a consular officer’s decision would not be able to 
fairly examine the record to determine whether a decision was justified because 
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guidelines for consular officers overseas, states that if the basis for 
refusal “is not entirely straightforward, the supervisory officer should 
review the case immediately.”44  To overcome a visa ineligibility, the 
State Department will consider any new evidence without additional 
costs to the applicant or petitioner if presented within one year of the 
visa denial.45  This is possible only when the applicant knows the basis 
for the denial and knows how to produce evidence to refute the 
government’s evidence.  While these internal review provisions may 
curb a consular officer’s discretion, U.S.-citizen petitioners and 
foreign applicants who do not receive notice of the grounds for their 
ineligibility, such as those applicants denied for potential links to 
terrorism-related activities or those whose visa is denied a second 
time, have no independent oversight, administrative appeals process, 
or opportunity for meaningful judicial review. 
B. Plenary Power and the Origins of Consular Nonreviewability 
Generally, federal courts have considered a consular officer’s 
decision unreviewable and, thus, have refused to review a visa 
denial.46  Known as the doctrine of consular nonreviewability or 
consular absolutism, this practice first emerged in two appellate cases 
in the 1920s and from the INA’s grant of broad discretion to consular 
officers.  In United States ex rel. London v. Phelps,47 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in dicta, refused to review a visa 
denial because of the diplomatic nature of granting and denying 
visas.48  In United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg,49 the U.S. Court of 
                                                          
limited resources prevent consular officers from documenting an extensive record 
about each visa decision). 
 44. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FAM, supra note 41, at 42.81 n.1.2. 
 45. 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e). 
 46. See, e.g., Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159–60 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(“For the greater part of this century, our court has therefore refused to review visa 
decisions of consular officials.”); Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970, 
970 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The doctrine of nonreviewability of a consul’s decision to grant 
or deny a visa stems from the Supreme Court’s confirming that the legislative power 
of Congress over the admission of aliens is virtually complete.”); Rivera de Gomez v. 
Kissinger, 534 F.2d 518, 519 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (affirming a district court’s 
decision to withhold jurisdiction to review a consular officer’s decision because 
Supreme Court precedent foreclosed it); Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182, 1184, 
1187–88 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (recognizing that a lawful permanent resident petitioning 
for a foreign spouse has standing to seek review but holding that Mandel and the 
doctrine of consular nonreviewability preclude any meaningful review). 
 47. 22 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1927). 
 48. See id. at 290 (“Whether the consul has acted reasonably or unreasonably is 
not for us to determine.  Unjustifiable refusal . . . may be ground for diplomatic 
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit argued that review was 
unavailable because the Immigration Act of 1924 lacked a provision 
granting review over consular officers’ decisions.50  Section 104(a) of 
the INA states that 
[t]he Secretary of State shall be charged with the administration 
and the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and all other 
immigration and nationality laws relating to (1) the powers, duties, 
and functions of diplomatic and consular officers of the United 
States, except those powers, duties, and functions conferred upon the 
consular officers relating to the granting or refusal of visas . . . .51 
Courts interpret this provision as granting consular officers broad 
authority over visa decisions.52 
The political branches’ plenary power over immigration matters 
further solidified the practice of consular nonreviewability.53  The 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,54 
                                                          
complaint by the nation whose subject has been discriminated against. . . .  It is 
beyond the jurisdiction of the court.”). 
 49. 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929). 
 50. See id. at 986 (“We are not able to find any provision of the immigration laws 
which provides for an official review of the action of the consular officers in such 
case by a cabinet officer or other authority.”); see also Nafziger, supra note 16, at 30 
(noting that the court’s interpretation of the Immigration Act of 1924 later led to a 
negative inference of review of consular officer’s decisions in section 104(a) of the INA). 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 52. See Nafziger, supra note 16, at 30 (arguing that it is incorrect to infer 
nonreviewability from section 104(a) of the INA because that section merely 
confirms a consular officer’s powers rather than points to nonreviewability or even 
broad discretion). 
 53. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972) (“[P]lenary 
congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been 
firmly established.”); Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (interpreting the plenary power doctrine to preclude judicial review over “the 
political nature of visa determinations”); see also Nafziger, supra note 16, at 30–31, 38–
49 (chronicling the various interpretations of and rationales for the plenary power 
doctrine to explain why courts limit judicial review over consular decisions); Tatyana 
E. Delgado, Note, Leaving the Doctrine of Consular Absolutism Behind, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 55, 55–56 (2010) (explaining that in granting or denying a visa, a consular 
officer is exercising power delegated by Congress, which has the power “to exclude 
[noncitizens] altogether from the United States”); Edward B. Quist, Note, Justice for 
the Alien:  The Adequacy of the Consular Visa Issuance System, 1986 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. 
REV. 457, 460 (1986) (describing the origins of consular nonreviewability as 
“puzzling”); Zas, supra note 17, at 590–91 (conceding that courts that rely on 
consular nonreviewability often state that Congress’s plenary power over immigration 
precludes review).  But see Mandel, 408 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“There 
were no rights of Americans involved in any of the old alien exclusion cases, and 
therefore their broad counsel about deference to the political branches is inapplicable.”). 
 54. (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,55 and Fong Yue Ting v. United States56 
held that the political branches’ power over immigration matters is 
rooted in sovereignty (delegated by the Constitution), their war 
powers, and their powers over international relations.57  Scholars 
interpret the plenary power doctrine to establish that Congress can 
prescribe the terms for the admission and removal of noncitizens and 
that the executive branch has unreviewable discretion to act within 
those terms.58  As a result, courts have deferred to Congress and the 
executive branch to define the due process rights available to 
noncitizens and, oftentimes, citizens affected by federal immigration 
law.59  As one scholar notes, however, courts also adhere to the 
plenary power doctrine to refuse standing to noncitizens and U.S. 
citizens asserting constitutional challenges to immigration laws.60 
1. Plenary power and noncitizen standing in federal courts 
The Supreme Court has relied on the plenary power doctrine to 
limit judicial review over constitutional challenges to immigration 
                                                          
 55. 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
 56. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 57. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713–14, 721–22, 724 (extending the Court’s 
reasoning in Chae Chan Ping and Nishimura Ekiu to deportation and relying on the 
political branches’ power over foreign policy decisions to justify its reasoning); 
Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659 (underscoring that an essential element of a nation’s 
sovereignty is the ability to decide the conditions for who may or may not enter the 
nation); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 602–03 (recognizing Congress’s implied 
sovereign power to exclude foreigners even though the Court was ambivalent about 
the precise source of this power). 
 58. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 329–30, 
339 (1909) (stating that Congress has complete power over decisions to admit 
aliens); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895) (reiterating that 
Congress has the power to “to prescribe the terms” for the admission and exclusion 
of foreigners, while the executive branch has the power to enforce the terms 
“without judicial intervention”); see also Nafziger, supra note 16, at 30–31, 39 
(chronicling the late 18th century and early 19th century cases which established the 
plenary power doctrine and stating that “[a]fter these pronouncements . . . the 
apotheosis of Congress and the genuflection of the courts continued”). 
 59. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
373, 375 (2004) (suggesting that most scholars interpret the plenary power doctrine 
“to reflect judicial deference to, or a lack of constitutional limitations on, Congress’s 
exercise of its immigration power,” but arguing that courts have incorrectly 
interpreted the plenary power doctrine to preclude citizens from challenging the 
constitutionality of immigration laws); Nafziger, supra note 16, at 30–31 (indicating 
that courts have applied the doctrine by deferring to Congress and the executive branch). 
 60. See Cox, supra note 59, at 386 (explaining that courts use the plenary power 
doctrine as a standing doctrine to insulate themselves from claims by noncitizens by 
arguing that the noncitizens do not have a right to be in court or to raise such claims). 
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laws.61  While courts have recognized that some procedural due 
process protections are available to noncitizens,62 the extent of those 
protections depends on whether the noncitizen is within the 
territorial bounds of the United States, at the border, or outside of 
the country.63  The Supreme Court has held that noncitizens already 
in the United States are entitled to more due process protections 
than noncitizens at the border or those outside of the country and 
applying for admission.64 
For example, the Supreme Court in Yamataya v. Fisher65 found that 
a noncitizen who entered the United States unlawfully but was 
present in the United States for four days could not be deported 
without an opportunity to be heard.66  By contrast, in United States ex 
                                                          
 61. Id. at 381 (stating that “the Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine to reject 
constitutional challenges to wide-ranging policies, including the statutory exclusion 
of Chinese nationals; the indefinite detention, without a hearing, of an alien seeking 
to enter America; and the ideological exclusion of scholars” (footnotes omitted)). 
 62. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 22 (1982) (affording a legal 
permanent resident procedural due process protections); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 
793 n.5 (1977) (affirming that the Court’s precedent indicates “limited judicial 
responsibility” despite Congress’s power over admission and exclusion of 
noncitizens); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 98, 100–
02 (1903) (granting procedural due process protections for a noncitizen unlawfully 
present in the United States for four days but still finding her deportable because the 
government did not deny her due process). 
 63. Compare Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–02 (finding that a noncitizen who 
unlawfully entered the United States could be deported because she had an 
opportunity to be heard and was not denied due process), with Shaughnessy v. 
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207, 214–15 (1953) (holding that an 
immigration officer could indefinitely exclude, without a hearing, a legal permanent 
resident who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years but who posed a 
national security threat); see also Cox, supra note 59, at 380 n.20 (“While it may seem 
straightforward to distinguish aliens inside the United States from those outside, it is 
important to note that the ‘entry fiction’ doctrine in immigration law permits the 
government to treat some aliens who are physically present in the United States as 
though they stand at the threshold of entry.”).  But see Charles D. Weisselberg, The 
Exclusion and Detention of Aliens:  Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 1004–10 (1995) (suggesting that judicial review and due 
process for noncitizens should not rely on the plenary power doctrine and outdated 
theories of “territorial fiction” because all people, regardless of their geographic 
location, should be deemed “persons” under the Due Process Clause). 
 64. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539–40, 
542–43 (1950) (protecting from judicial scrutiny a discretionary executive branch decision 
that barred a noncitizen spouse who arrived at a port of entry and sought admission). 
 65. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 66. See id. at 100 (explaining that administrative officers may not deny due 
process when executing a statute that implicates a person’s liberty interests). 
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rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,67 the Supreme Court held that the foreign 
spouse of a U.S. citizen detained at a port of entry was not entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing to contest the reasons for her exclusion.68  
Mrs. Knauff’s admission was perceived to be prejudicial to U.S. 
interests during wartime, but the Court still reasoned that the 
executive branch reasonably applied the provisions barring her 
admission and stated that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by 
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned.”69  In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,70 the Court found three 
legal permanent residents deportable as a result of their former 
affiliations with the Communist Party.71  The Supreme Court held 
that immigration laws supporting their deportation were 
constitutional, reasoning that immigration policies should be 
“immune from judicial inquiry.”72  And, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, the 
Court refused to grant standing to a noncitizen visa applicant who 
the government had excluded for his ideological beliefs because he 
had “no constitutional right of entry.”73 
These decisions underscore the Supreme Court’s adherence to the 
legislative and executive branches’ plenary power over immigration 
matters.  Importantly, however, the decisions highlight what one 
scholar has identified as the three manifestations of the plenary 
power doctrine:  to justify judicial deference to the political branches, 
to grant unlimited power over immigration matters to Congress and 
the executive branch, and to exclude noncitizens from standing in 
                                                          
 67. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 68. See id. at 544, 546 (“Under the immigration laws and regulations applicable to 
all aliens seeking entry into the United States during the national emergency, she 
was excluded by the Attorney General without a hearing [and] . . . we have no 
authority to retry th[at] determination . . . .”). 
 69. See id. at 544.  Although the Supreme Court’s decision ultimately prevented 
Mrs. Knauff from entering the United States, pressure from congressional officials 
and the public later convinced the Attorney General to reopen Mrs. Knauff’s case.  
See Weisselberg, supra note 63, at 958 n.127, 961.  Eventually, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) allowed Mrs. Knauff to present evidence that she did not 
pose a national security threat.  Id. at 963.  The BIA determined that there was no 
substantial evidence to justify her exclusion and ultimately allowed her to seek 
permanent residence in the United States.  Id. at 963–64. 
 70. 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
 71. Id. at 581. 
 72. See id. at 589, 591 (exercising judicial restraint and stating that a court must 
tolerate Congress’s policies even if the court disagrees with Congress). 
 73. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); see infra Part I.B.2 
(discussing how the Court in Mandel instead granted standing to the U.S. citizens 
who were petitioning for Mr. Mandel’s visa). 
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federal courts.74  As such, federal courts have used the plenary power 
doctrine to justify consular nonreviewability largely by refusing 
noncitizens, and sometimes U.S. citizens, standing in court.75  As the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mandel demonstrated, however, the 
Court avoided granting the noncitizen standing by instead granting 
the U.S. citizens standing because the U.S. citizens’ fundamental 
rights were implicated in the visa denial.76 
2.  Mandel exception to consular nonreviewability 
Despite longstanding adherence to consular nonreviewability, in 
1972, the Supreme Court in Mandel first recognized that a denial of a 
visa waiver might sometimes merit limited judicial review.77  In 
Mandel, a group of U.S.-citizen professors invited Ernest Mandel, a 
Belgian journalist and author, to speak at a conference at Stanford 
University.78  Although Mr. Mandel was not a member of the 
Communist Party, he was known as “a revolutionary Marxist” who 
advocated for world communism.79  The Consul in Belgium denied 
Mr. Mandel’s visa, and the Attorney General refused to grant him a 
waiver because Mr. Mandel had violated the conditions of a previous 
entry into the United States.80  Soon after, Mr. Mandel and the U.S.-
citizen professors who invited him to the U.S. filed a complaint in 
                                                          
 74. See Cox, supra note 59, at 381–82 (insisting that courts and immigration 
scholars generally do not divide the plenary power doctrine into this clear-cut typology). 
 75. See, e.g., Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762 (asserting that Mr. Mandel lacks standing 
because he has “no constitutional right of entry” and is thus a “symbolic” plaintiff 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647 n.3 (1st Cir. 
1990) (citing Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)) 
(expressing that a visa applicant does not “have standing to seek either 
administrative or judicial review of the consular officer’s decision to deny him a 
visa”); Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1114 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988) (interpreting Mandel 
to hold that a noncitizen does not have standing to bring a constitutional challenge 
to a visa denial in U.S. federal courts). 
 76. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762. 
 77. Id. at 769. 
 78. Id. at 756–57. 
 79. Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. Id. at 759.  The plaintiffs alleged that the Attorney General’s stated reason for 
finding that Mr. Mandel violated the terms of a previous entry into the United States 
was not the real basis for the government’s decision to deny Mr. Mandel a visa waiver.  
Id. at 760.  The plaintiffs believed that the Attorney General excluded Mr. Mandel 
because of his ideological beliefs and, therefore, asserted that the visa denial was not 
based on a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.  Id.  In a dissenting opinion, 
Justice Marshall agreed with the plaintiff and argued that the visa waiver denial was a 
“sham” to cover the government’s real basis for excluding Mr. Mandel:  his political 
ideology.  See id. at 778–79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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federal court alleging that the statutes barring Mr. Mandel’s entry 
and the Attorney General’s refusal to grant a visa waiver deprived the 
professors, all U.S. citizens, of their First and Fifth Amendment rights.81 
In finding that it could review Mr. Mandel’s visa denial, the 
Supreme Court implicitly engaged in a two-part inquiry.  First, it 
determined that the U.S. plaintiffs had standing in federal court to 
seek review of the visa waiver denial because the government’s actions 
implicated their First Amendment rights to have Mr. Mandel enter 
and speak in the United States.82  Second, after finding such rights 
implicated, the Court stated that it could review the decision to 
ensure that the government had provided a “facially legitimate and 
bona fide reason” for the denial.83  Ultimately, the Court in Mandel 
found that the government’s reasoning—that Mr. Mandel had 
violated a previous condition of admission—was a facially legitimate 
reason for denying the visa waiver and, thus, that no further review 
was necessary.84 
While subsequent cases and scholars have interpreted the Court’s 
decision in Mandel as having carved out an exception to consular 
nonreviewability, the Court rooted its limited holding in the plenary 
power doctrine.  In his dissent, Justice Marshall cautioned against the 
majority’s reliance on the plenary power doctrine to limit the review 
                                                          
 81. See Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 622 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d sub nom. 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (arguing that the statutory provisions in 
question and visa denial failed to provide the professors adequate due process 
protections or to guard against arbitrary executive branch actions). 
 82. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 769–70 (recognizing that First Amendment 
protections and the right to free speech includes a U.S. citizen’s right to receive 
information from foreign speakers); cf. Judy Wurtzel, Note, First Amendment 
Limitations on the Exclusion of Aliens, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 149, 161 n.89 (1987) 
(distinguishing Mandel and United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 
(1904), where the Supreme Court held that a noncitizen could not contest his 
deportation on First Amendment grounds because a noncitizen does not have “an 
independent constitutional right to enter and speak”). 
 83. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 769–70.  The Court stated it could “neither look 
behind the exercise of [a consular officer’s] discretion, nor test it by balancing its 
justification against the First Amendment interests” of the U.S. citizen plaintiffs 
where the official offers “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for his negative 
use of discretion.  Id. at 770.  The Court emphasized the limited procedural due 
process protections available to noncitizens and cited the Court’s long line of cases 
endorsing the plenary power doctrine.  Id. at 766–67. 
 84. See id. at 769 (finding that the immigration officer validly exercised his 
powers when he denied Mr. Mandel’s visa waiver after he concluded that Mr. Mandel 
violated the terms of entry on a visa previously issued to him). 
BACA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  7:56 PM 
610 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:591 
given to the U.S. citizens’ claims.85  Justice Marshall, with the majority 
of the Court seeming to agree, argued that Mr. Mandel’s case was 
easily distinguishable from the “old” plenary power cases because 
none of those cases involved the rights of U.S. citizens.86  Even in the 
aftermath of Knauff—the plenary power case decided twenty years 
before Mandel that did involve the rights of a U.S.-citizen spouse—
Congress, the public, and the Department of Justice demonstrated 
their disagreement with an immigration official’s raw and absolute 
power to deny admission to a foreign national with strong ties to the 
United States.87  Despite Justice Marshall’s dissent, the majority stated 
that it would not balance the U.S. citizens’ rights with the reasons given 
for the denial and held that the government offered a valid reason.88 
In sum, Mandel offered a two-part inquiry for when review applies:  
first, a court must determine whether a U.S. citizen’s First 
Amendment rights are affected by a visa waiver denial, and second, if 
such rights are implicated, the court must then determine if the 
denial was based on a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.89  The 
Court in Mandel did not provide further guidance about the scope of 
its decision.90  Does the decision apply only to visa waivers or to all 
consular decisions?  After Mandel, it became well settled that 
                                                          
 85. See id. at 777–79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding that the government has 
not provided a “compelling governmental interest” to justify infringing on U.S. citizens’ 
First Amendment rights (emphasis added)).  Justice Marshall argued that a 
“legitimate governmental interest[] cannot override” the long-established standard 
for justifying a burden on a U.S. citizen’s fundamental rights.  Id. at 777 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 86. See id. at 781–82 (challenging the majority’s plenary power reasoning and 
observing that the majority’s use of the cases to limit review was misplaced because all 
of the cases to which the majority cited involved the rights of noncitizens). 
 87. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (grappling with the irony in the 
final outcome of United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, which, despite the Supreme 
Court’s holding, ultimately resulted in the executive branch recognizing that it did 
not have substantial evidence to exclude Mrs. Knauff). 
 88. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770 (holding that the government need only provide a 
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for denying a visa and explaining that in 
the presence of such a justification, a court does not need to balance the strength of 
the government’s reason against a U.S. citizen’s First Amendment rights). 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 82–84 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
findings in Mandel). 
 90. See Nafziger, supra note 16, at 33–34 (asserting that, although unclear, the 
Court in Mandel has simultaneously promoted judicial abstention when it reiterated 
the doctrine of consular nonreviewability and encouraged review by finding that some 
review exists through the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” standard 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Wurtzel, supra note 82, at 163 (“Mandel leaves 
many questions unanswered.”). 
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noncitizens, alone, do not have a right to review of a visa denial.91  
But, does review apply when a U.S. citizen’s “constitutionally 
protected rights” are implicated?  This question has become a source 
of disagreement among federal courts. 
a. Rights recognized under Mandel’s first inquiry 
The Court in Mandel exclusively addressed the U.S.-citizen 
professors’ First Amendment claims.92  The Court neither limited nor 
elaborated on what other rights would trigger review.93  Subsequent 
cases have widely recognized similar First Amendment claims as 
triggering Mandel review,94 but courts are in conflict about whether 
Mandel applies to plaintiffs who assert a violation of their 
constitutionally protected interests in the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause, such as the right to marriage.95  Some courts 
recognize that a visa denial involving a foreign spouse and a U.S. 
citizen, implicates a protected interest in marriage and family life, 
thereby allowing for Mandel review.96  However, other courts have 
held that such denial does not implicate the marriage rights of a U.S. 
citizen spouse and, therefore, does not trigger Mandel review.97 
i. First Amendment cases triggering Mandel review 
Courts have consistently recognized that visa denials implicating 
the First Amendment rights of U.S. citizens merit Mandel review.  The 
                                                          
 91. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762; see Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1114 n.4 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (stating that Mandel held that a noncitizen cannot challenge the denial of 
a visa on constitutional grounds and that a noncitizen’s participation in visa denial 
litigation is “purely symbolic”). 
 92. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 759, 762. 
 93. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s ambiguity 
concerning whether Mandel applies to more than First Amendment claims). 
 94. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 
2009) (applying Mandel review to a First Amendment claim); Allende, 845 F.2d at 
115–16 (same); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1074–76 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(same), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam). 
 95. Compare Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 555–57 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(refusing to recognize a U.S. citizen’s fundamental right to marriage as a trigger for 
Mandel review), with Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that a U.S. citizen’s fundamental rights are implicated by the denial of her 
foreign spouse’s visa). 
 96. E.g., Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1062. 
 97. See, e.g., Burrafato, 523 F.2d at 556–57 (asserting that a U.S. citizen lacks 
standing to bring a Mandel claim based on the right to marriage); Hermina Sague v. 
United States, 416 F. Supp. 217, 220 (D.P.R. 1976) (same). 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in Allende v. Shultz98 
that U.S. citizens who invited Hortensia de Allende, the widow of a 
former Chilean president, to speak in the United States were entitled 
to judicial review of the visa denial because the denial violated their 
First Amendment rights to “receive information.”99  The First Circuit 
extended Mandel review to Allende’s claim and implicitly recognized 
that Mandel review applies to both visa denials and visa waiver denials.100 
Similarly, the Second Circuit in American Academy of Religion v. 
Napolitano101 held that Mandel review applied to a consular officer’s 
denial of a Swiss-born Islamic scholar’s visa because the U.S.-citizen 
plaintiffs who invited him to speak asserted a valid First Amendment 
claim.102  In Abourezk v. Reagan,103 the D.C. Circuit found that the 
plaintiffs raised valid statutory and First Amendment claims 
challenging the visa denials of three foreign citizens that the U.S.-
citizen plaintiffs had invited to speak in the United States.104  
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit in Saavedra Bruno v. Albright105 
reiterated Abourezk’s holding that judicial review is appropriate under 
Mandel only when U.S. citizens claim that a visa denial has violated 
their constitutional rights.106  In Bruno, a consular officer denied the 
visa of a Bolivian national who was employed by a U.S. citizen because 
of the Bolivian national’s alleged ties to drug trafficking.107  The 
plaintiffs contended that the consular officer’s denial violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) presumption of judicial 
review.108  In contrast to Abourezk, the court in Bruno held that the 
U.S.-citizen plaintiffs, the noncitizen’s U.S. employers, had not 
suffered a cognizable injury that would trigger review under the APA 
                                                          
 98. 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 99. See id. at 1112, 1114, 1120–21 (applying Mandel to a visa denial instead of a 
denial of a waiver of inadmissibility as in Mandel). 
 100. Id. at 1120–21. 
 101. 573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 102. See id. at 117, 119, 125 (“We conclude that, where a plaintiff, with standing to 
do so, asserts a First Amendment claim to have a visa applicant present views in this 
country, we should apply Mandel to a consular officer’s denial of a visa.”). 
 103. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam). 
 104. Id. at 1048–50. 
 105. 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 106. Id. at 1163. 
 107. Id. at 1155. 
 108. Id. 
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or Mandel because the plaintiffs had not asserted a violation of their 
constitutional rights.109 
ii. Cases endorsing the fundamental right to marriage as a trigger 
for Mandel review 
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly confirmed that a denial of a 
foreign spouse’s visa triggers Mandel review.  In Bustamante v. Mukasey, 
a U.S. citizen asserted that she had a protected liberty interest in her 
marriage to a foreign spouse and that this preexisting interest 
allowed her to seek Mandel review after a consular officer denied her 
husband’s visa because the denial impinged on her liberty interest.110  
The court held that Mandel review applied because the plaintiff was a 
U.S. citizen “raising a constitutional challenge” to a visa denial, which 
entitled her to review.111  The court tacitly endorsed the view that 
physical separation from a foreign spouse infringes on a U.S. citizen’s 
right to freedom of personal choice in marriage and family matters.112  
Once the court declared that the spouse’s liberty interest was 
implicated by the visa denial, it asserted that the court was entitled to 
engage in a limited review of the reasons offered for the denial.113 
Similarly, in Din v. Kerry, the Ninth Circuit considered a U.S.-citizen 
spouse’s claim for review of her husband’s visa denial.114  In Din, a 
consular officer denied the U.S. citizen’s spouse’s visa on account of 
the spouse’s alleged ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan.115  The 
consular officer cited a broad provision in the terrorism 
inadmissibility grounds to justify the spouse’s exclusion but did not 
include further facts or an explanation supporting the denial.116  In 
                                                          
 109. See id. at 1163–64 (arguing that the U.S.-citizen petitioners’ interests 
terminated as soon as the petitioners filed a successful application with USCIS). 
 110. Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 111. See id. (following a similar analysis as the First, Second, and D.C. Circuits to 
conclude that a U.S. citizen’s constitutional challenge to a visa denial triggers 
Mandel review). 
 112. See id. (acknowledging but not elaborating on the idea that “[f]reedom of 
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is, of course, one of the 
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause”). 
 113. See id. (arguing that the government cannot infringe on liberty interests 
without “constitutionally adequate procedures” (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985))). 
 114. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 859.  A visa denial based on a terrorism-related inadmissibility ground is 
exempt from the INA’s notice provisions.  Thus, the consular officer did not have to 
explain the reasons for the denial to the denied applicant.  See supra notes 39–40 and 
accompanying text. 
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reviewing Mrs. Din’s claims, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that she had 
a protected interest in marriage to a foreign spouse and applied 
Mandel review.117  Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bustamante, 
which held that the consular officer had provided a facially legitimate 
reason for the visa denial, the Ninth Circuit in Din determined that 
the consular officer’s bare citation to a broad statute was not a 
sufficient reason for the denial.118  Despite the Ninth Circuit’s 
unequivocal acceptance that the consular officer’s decisions 
implicated Mrs. Din’s and Mrs. Bustamante’s constitutionally 
protected interests, other circuits have been less willing to find that 
such interests are at stake. 
iii.  Cases rejecting the fundamental right to marriage as a trigger 
for Mandel review 
The fundamental right to marriage and freedom of personal 
choice in family life provides only a tenuous avenue into Mandel 
review in other federal courts.  In Burrafato v. U.S. Department of 
State,119 an Italian citizen waiting for a visa unlawfully entered the 
United States.120  The State Department denied his visa before 
explaining the reasons for the denial.121  His U.S.-citizen wife alleged 
that the denial of his visa implicated her constitutional rights.122 
The Second Circuit declined to review her claim that the State 
Department had not complied with its own regulations when it failed 
to notify her and her spouse of the reasons for the denial.123  
Although the court declared that Mandel requires a justification 
before excluding a noncitizen, it ultimately determined that it did 
not have jurisdiction to review the claim because it interpreted 
Mandel as only applying to First Amendment claims, and the U.S.-
citizen spouse only asserted a general violation of her constitutional 
                                                          
 117. See Din, 718 F.3d at 860–61.  The court in Din approvingly cited to Bustamante 
and stated that Mrs. Din’s spouse’s right to judicial review was rooted in Mrs. Din’s 
more general right to marriage.  Id. at 860; cf. Atiffi v. Kerry, No. Civ. S-12-3002 
LKK/DAN, 2013 WL 5954818 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2013) (recognizing that a “a citizen 
has a protected liberty interest in marriage that entitles the citizen to review of the 
denial of a spouse’s visa” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 118. See Din, 718 F.3d at 862 (criticizing the government for not providing a 
facially legitimate reason for denying Mrs. Din’s spouse’s visa and chastising the visa 
denial because it was “completely void” of a justification). 
 119. 523 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 120. Id. at 555. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 554–55. 
 123. Id. at 555–56. 
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rights.124  Similarly, in Hermina Sague v. United States,125 a U.S. citizen 
alleged that her spouse’s visa denial “deprived [her] of her right to 
live within the territory of the United States with her husband and 
her family.”126  Unlike in Burrafato, where the U.S. citizen asserted a 
general violation of her constitutional rights, in Hermina Sague, the 
U.S. citizen identified a specific constitutional right that the 
government infringed upon when it denied her spouse’s visa.127  Still, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held that a U.S.-
citizen spouse did not have a constitutional right to have her foreign 
spouse enter the United States and refused to recognize that Mandel 
review applied.128 
Likewise, recent decisions by the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia have refused to recognize that a U.S.-citizen spouse’s 
rights are implicated by the denial of his or her spouse’s visa.  In 
Udugampola v. Jacobs,129 a consular officer denied Mr. Udugampola’s 
visa because of his perceived ties to terrorism.130  Mr. Udugampola, a 
Sri Lankan citizen, and his U.S.-citizen wife and U.S.-citizen daughter 
sought review of the visa denial under Mandel, asserting that the Fifth 
Amendment protects against arbitrary government actions that 
infringe on his wife and daughter’s liberty interests.131  Mr. 
Udugampola’s wife alleged that she had a constitutionally protected 
interest in her right to marry and in her marital relationship.132  
Further, Mr. Udugampola’s daughter contended that she had a 
constitutionally protected interest in maintaining a relationship with 
her father.133  The court rejected both claims, reasoning that his 
daughter’s rights were not implicated because the visa denial was not 
aimed specifically at interfering with Mr. Udugampola’s relationship 
                                                          
 124. Id. at 555–57 (distinguishing Burrafato’s case from other consular 
nonreviewability cases after Mandel, all of which involved First Amendment claims 
within the federal courts’ jurisdictional purview, because Burrafato did not 
“implicate[]” constitutional rights over which the federal courts have jurisdiction). 
 125. 416 F. Supp. 217 (D.P.R. 1976). 
 126. Id. at 220. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. (asserting that a U.S.-citizen spouse “who voluntarily chooses to marry” a 
foreign citizen lacks a right “to have her alien spouse enter the United States” 
because to possess that right would contravene U.S. sovereignty to decide who may 
enter the United States). 
 129. 795 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, No. 11-5215, 2011 WL 5903822 
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 17, 2011). 
 130. Id. at 98. 
 131. Id. at 98, 104–05. 
 132. Id. at 105. 
 133. Id. at 104. 
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with her and that his wife’s rights were not implicated when her 
husband was denied entry.134 
Like in Udugampola, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia in Jathoul v. Clinton135 found that a U.S.-citizen spouse’s 
marriage rights are not implicated by a denial of her spouse’s visa, 
and, therefore, held that Mrs. Jathoul failed to present a valid 
constitutional claim.136  In Jathoul, a consular officer found Mr. 
Jathoul inadmissible under terrorism-related inadmissibility 
grounds.137  Mrs. Jathoul, a U.S. citizen, argued that her husband had 
never engaged in terrorist activities and that he was not given an 
opportunity to present evidence to the contrary.138  Mrs. Jathoul 
alleged that the consular officer and the State Department violated 
her due process rights by failing to provide her with their reasons for 
denying her husband’s visa and, thereby, burdened her 
constitutionally protected interest in her marriage.139  The court 
rejected Bustamante, which recognized that a foreign spouse’s visa 
denial implicated a U.S. citizen’s liberty interests in marriage, because 
it believed Bustamante conflicted with D.C. Circuit precedent.140 
b. Standard of review under Mandel’s second inquiry 
When a court finds that a visa denial implicates a U.S. citizen’s 
rights,141 thus triggering Mandel review, courts then determine if the 
                                                          
 134. See id. at 105 (“Courts have repeatedly held that these constitutional rights 
are not implicated when one spouse is removed or denied entry into the United 
States . . . .”).  The court further stated that the denial did not infringe on Mrs. 
Udugampola’s marital relationship with her husband because the government had 
“done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners 
may not be in the United States.”  Id. at 106 (quoting Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 
102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970)). 
 135. 880 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 136. Id. at 169. 
 137. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. at 172 (following the D.C. Circuit’s decision and reasoning from Swartz 
v. Rogers, where the court did not find a violation of a liberty interest in marriage 
when the petitioner’s husband was deported, and arguing that the court in 
Bustamante accepted the plaintiff’s claims “at face value and did not consider whether 
the visa denial actually implicated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 141. Recognizing that courts are split about when Mandel review applies, the use 
of “rights” in this sentence assumes that a court has recognized that either a First 
Amendment claim or Fifth Amendment due process claim is present and proceeds to 
the next step of Mandel review. 
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visa denial was based on a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.142  
The Mandel decision did not identify what constitutes a facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason for denying a visa, and prior and 
subsequent cases provide minimal guidance on what the standard 
means.143  In a number of cases finding the First Amendment 
rights of U.S. citizens implicated, some courts have stated that a 
consular officer can offer “almost any reason, even if it is 
conclusory,” or can offer a reason that is “supported by neither 
evidence nor argumentation.”144 
For example, in Adams v. Baker,145 the First Circuit determined that 
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reasons include sufficient evidence 
from which a consular officer could form a “reasonable ground to 
believe” that a noncitizen has engaged in terrorism-related 
activities.146  In Baker, the State Department denied an Irish citizen’s 
visa because he was the president of an organization that the 
government believed engaged in terrorist activities.147  The First 
Circuit found that the U.S.-citizen plaintiffs raised a valid First 
Amendment claim and applied Mandel review.148  The court 
ultimately agreed with the district court and held that the 
government had sufficient evidence to link Mr. Adams with terrorist 
                                                          
 142. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (finding that the 
government had offered a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for denying Mr. 
Mandel’s visa waiver and stating that this was all the review necessary); Burrafato v. 
U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir. 1975) (interpreting Mandel’s second 
inquiry to “require justification for an aliens exclusion”). 
 143. Compare Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1116 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that 
the government cannot exclude a noncitizen with a “bare assertion” that the 
noncitizen’s presence contravenes U.S. foreign policy interests), with Marczak v. 
Greene, 971 F.2d 510, 517 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that the facially legitimate 
standard is “used relatively infrequently, [so] its meaning is elusive,” and that 
therefore a consular officer’s decision must be reasonably supported by the record).  
See generally Nafziger, supra note 16, at 75–76 (stating that Mandel’s standard of review 
is ambiguous); Wurtzel, supra note 82, at 163 (suggesting that Mandel’s unclear and 
“elastic” standard of review results in “divergent” interpretations). 
 144. See Wurtzel, supra note 82, at 163–64 (denouncing the “facially legitimate and 
bona fide” standard as “toothless” because it allows the government to offer almost 
any reason for a denial, making it “impossible to differentiate between legitimate and 
pretextual reasons”). 
 145. 909 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 146. Id. at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147. Id. at 645. 
 148. Id. at 647–50. 
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activity such that the visa denial was based on facially legitimate and 
bona fide reasons.149 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Mandel standard is 
ambiguous.  Like the First Circuit in Baker, the Ninth Circuit in 
Bustamante determined that a consular officer “had reason to believe” 
that the U.S. citizen’s spouse had engaged in drug trafficking because 
the consular officer had received evidence from the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) linking the noncitizen spouse to drug 
trafficking.150  The court found the link to be sufficient to meet the 
Mandel standard.151  In Din, however, the Ninth Circuit found that a 
consular officer’s citation to a provision in a statute alone, without 
accompanying factual allegations, was not sufficient to meet the 
facially legitimate and bona fide standard.152  Although the Mandel 
standard is also a source of disagreement among federal circuits, this 
Comment will not examine Mandel’s second inquiry and instead will 
focus on Mandel’s first inquiry. 
C. Supreme Court Cases Protecting the Fundamental Right to Marital 
Relationships and the Right to Live with One’s Extended Family 
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause protects against 
arbitrary government actions that deprive an individual of “life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”153  When an 
individual asserts a procedural due process claim, the individual must 
demonstrate that the government has deprived him or her of a liberty 
or property interest.154  A liberty or property interest exists if an 
individual can demonstrate that courts uphold it as a constitutionally 
protected interest or if a federal statute grants an individual a 
protected interest.155  The Supreme Court has long afforded 
                                                          
 149. See id. at 649–50 (noting that a consular officer’s decision regarding a visa 
applicant’s relationship with terrorism and the information used to reach that 
conclusion is “subject only to a very narrow review”). 
 150. Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 861, 867 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. 
Ct. 44 (2014). 
 153. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 154. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) (“It is apparent from our decisions 
that there exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are 
nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ as 
meant in the Due Process Clause.”). 
 155. See Udugampola v. Jacobs, 795 F. Supp. 2d 96, 104 (D.D.C.) (“[T]he interests 
that are comprehended within the meaning of either liberty or property, as covered 
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protections to the family and has declared that unreasonable or 
arbitrary government actions interfering with an individual’s right to 
marry and to raise a family, to choose where to reside, and to live with 
extended family members merit close scrutiny.  This section provides 
an overview of the Supreme Court cases guaranteeing that these 
rights are fundamental liberty interests and therefore deserve 
heightened procedural due process protection. 
1. Supreme Court cases protecting the fundamental right to marriage 
and to raise a family 
Courts have long protected against unwarranted government 
intrusion in matters of marriage and family life.  In 1923, the 
Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska156 held that the right “to marry 
[and] establish a home and bring up children” is a long-recognized 
privilege “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”157  Since Meyer, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the right to 
marry and experience family life in several cases.158  For example, in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,159 the Court considered the 
constitutionality of an Oklahoma law that allowed for the sterilization 
of all men convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude 
and sentenced in an Oklahoma penal institution.160  In finding that 
“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence 
and survival of the race,” the Court struck down the law on equal 
                                                          
by the due process clause of the Constitution, are those interests which have 
attain[ed] constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially 
recognized or protected by state law or federal law.” (alterations in original) 
(quoting Doe v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985))), appeal 
dismissed, No. 11-5215, 2011 WL 5903822 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 17, 2011). 
 156. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 157. Id. at 399; see also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (identifying 
marriage as the “most important relation in life”). 
 158. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that a 
Texas statute that criminalized intimate sexual conduct between persons of the same 
sex violated the Due Process Clause); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasizing that state regulations cannot invade the 
intimacies of family life); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 
(1974) (stating that the decision to have a child is a freedom protected by the 
Constitution); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (finding that due 
process prohibits a state from denying couples from getting a divorce solely because 
of their inability to pay for one); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
(invalidating a state ban on interracial marriages for violating the appellants’ right to 
marry under the Due Process Clause). 
 159. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 160. Id. at 536. 
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protection grounds because the law did not apply to individuals 
convicted of similar crimes.161  Similarly, in Griswold v. Connecticut,162 
the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a state law that imposed 
criminal liability against any person who used or assisted in the use of 
contraceptives.163  The Court found that the state law violated the 
fundamental right to marital privacy.164  In Boddie v. Connecticut,165 the 
Court recognized that “marriage involves interests of basic 
importance in our society” and struck down a state law that barred 
spouses unable to pay for divorce proceedings from getting a divorce.166 
After the Supreme Court decided Mandel in 1972, the Court 
continued to solidify the broad protections available to married 
couples and families.  In 1974, the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board 
of Education v. LaFleur167 struck down a school board regulation that 
required teachers to take maternity leave five months before 
childbirth.168  The Court cited decades of precedent recognizing 
“freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life,” 
such as choices related to “whether to bear . . . a child.”169  In 1978, in 
Zablocki v. Redhail,170 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a 
Wisconsin statute that prohibited granting marriage licenses to 
individuals who had failed to pay child support for their noncustodial 
children.171  The Court found the Wisconsin statute unreasonably 
interfered with the plaintiff’s desire to marry, stating that “it would 
make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other 
matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the 
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”172  
                                                          
 161. See id. at 541 (stating that sterilization violates a basic liberty and declaring 
that when two crimes are “intrinsically” similar but the law imposes sterilization on 
one crime and not the other, there is an unequal application of the law); see also 
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ 
fundamental to our very existence and survival.” (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541)). 
 162. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 163. Id. at 486. 
 164. See id. (stating that marriage is an intimate association “that promotes a way 
of life, . . . a harmony in living, . . . a bilateral loyalty”); see also id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (explaining that to determine whether a right is fundamental, the issue 
is whether the right can be denied without violating fundamental principals of liberty). 
 165. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
 166. Id. at 376, 383. 
 167. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
 168. Id. at 642. 
 169. Id. at 639–40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 171. Id. at 375, 390–91. 
 172. Id. at 386. 
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Then, in 1987, in Turner v. Safley,173 the Supreme Court struck down a 
prison regulation that required the prison superintendent to 
determine if there was a “compelling reason” for a marriage between 
an inmate and another inmate or a civilian before the 
superintendent could approve the marriage.174  The Court stated that 
marriage can be an expression of “emotional support and public 
commitment” and that “marriage [can have] spiritual significance” 
because it can demonstrate a couple’s religious faith.175  The Court 
held that, regardless of the prison context, inmates have a 
constitutionally protected interest in marriage and that the existing 
permission requirements were not reasonably related to the 
expressed penological interests of maintaining prisoner safety.176 
Similarly, in 1996 in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.177 and in 2003 in Lawrence v. 
Texas,178 the Supreme Court again emphasized that decisions about 
marriage, family life, and raising children are some of the most basic 
and important liberty interests in U.S. society that merit protection.179  
Recently, in United States v. Windsor,180 the Supreme Court struck 
down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and highlighted how 
failing to legally recognize marriage between same-sex couples 
burdens financial, emotional, and other vital personal relations 
between married couples.181  Noting that DOMA prevents the 
children of same-sex couples from “understand[ing] the integrity and 
closeness of their own family,” the Court stated that DOMA confers 
same-sex couples with a “second-tier marriage” that is “otherwise . . . 
unworthy of federal recognition.182  This line of casesfrom 1923 to 
presentaffirming the rights to marriage, family relationships, and 
procreation demonstrates the Supreme Court’s undeviating 
protection of these institutions and activities. 
                                                          
 173. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 174. See id. at 97–98 (striking down the regulation because it was “not reasonably 
related” to the security concerns with permitting an inmate to marry). 
 175. Id. at 95–96. 
 176. Id. at 96. 
 177. 519 U.S. 102 (1996). 
 178. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 179. Id. at 573–74; see M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113, 116 (repeating that choices related 
to marriage, familial relationships, and raising children are among the most important). 
 180. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 181.  Id. at 2694–95. 
 182.  Id. at 2694. 
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2. Supreme Court cases recognizing the fundamental right to live with 
one’s extended family 
The Supreme Court has also held that an individual has a 
fundamental right to live with his or her immediate or extended 
family in one household.  In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,183 the 
Court struck down a Cleveland ordinance that prohibited a grandson 
from living with his grandmother because they did not qualify as 
members of the same “family” under the ordinance’s definition of 
the term.184  The Court reasoned that “when the government intrudes 
on choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must 
examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests 
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged 
regulation.”185  The Court relied on the traditional role of the family 
in U.S. society to bolster its arguments against the regulation.186  
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality of the Court, stated that the 
right to live with one’s nuclear and extended family is deeply rooted 
in the value U.S. society has placed in shared support between family 
members and in passing down family values between generations.187  
He acknowledged that either “[o]ut of choice, necessity, or a sense of 
family responsibility, it has been common for close relatives to draw 
together and participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a 
common home.”188  According to the Court, these traditions and the 
family’s central role in society merit constitutional protection.189  In 
his concurrence, Justice Brennan underscored the duties of courts 
                                                          
 183. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 184. See id. at 498 (criticizing Cleveland’s ordinance because it “slic[es] deeply 
into the family” by arbitrarily “select[ing] certain categories of relatives who may live 
together”).  The city established the ordinance purportedly to reduce overcrowding, 
minimize traffic congestion, and ensure the financial stability of the school system.  
Id. at 499–500. The Court dismissed the city’s proffered reasons for the ordinance 
because the ordinance would do little to enable them.  Id. at 500. 
 185. Id. at 499.  Justice Powell distinguished the Court’s earlier decision in a 
similar case by stating that the ordinance in the earlier case did not affect related 
individuals.  Id. at 498. 
 186. See id. at 503–05 (“Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the 
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition.”); see id. at 507 (Brennan, J,. concurring) 
(indicating that cities should not be permitted to manipulate their exercise of the 
zoning power to intrude into the privacy of the family). 
 187. Id. at 503–05 (plurality opinion). 
 188. Id. at 505. 
 189. Id. at 503–06. 
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and of the government to protect against any arbitrary intrusions into 
family interests, and he included extended families in such interests.190 
Even in cases involving adoption, the Supreme Court has 
recognized a fundamental right to reside with one’s immediate family 
members.  In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and 
Reform,191 the Court considered the validity of New York state 
procedures that removed foster children from their foster families.192  
The New York state procedures entitled foster parents to ten days 
notice before the state would remove a child from their custody, as 
well as an opportunity for an administrative hearing at their 
request.193  In evaluating the state’s actions, the Court suggested that 
familiesincluding foster families—have a liberty interest in 
remaining together as a family unit and, therefore, are entitled to 
some procedural due process before a state can remove foster 
children from their care.194  Ultimately, the Court determined that 
New York’s procedures were adequate to support the liberty interests 
that the plaintiffs asserted.195 
                                                          
 190. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 191. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
 192. See id. at 829–32 (detailing the limited procedures foster parents have to 
contest an abrupt decision by a state child placement agency to remove the child 
from the foster family’s care as a result of a finding by that agency that the child 
should be transferred to another foster family or returned to his or her birth parents). 
 193. Id. at 829. 
 194. See id. at 843 (reasoning that biological parent-child relationships, which 
typically do not exist between foster parents and foster children, are not the sole 
determinants of the existence of a family unit and that “[t]he basic foundation of the 
family in our society, the marriage relationship, is of course not a matter of blood 
relation”).  The Court cited to the line of marriage cases recognizing that marriage is 
a fundamental right that deserves constitutional protection and then added that 
the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and 
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the 
intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in promot[ing] a way 
of life through the instruction of children as well as from the fact of blood 
relationship.  No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and 
interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care 
may exist even in the absence of blood relationship. 
Id. at 843–44 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 195. Id. at 855–56. 
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3. Supreme Court and circuit court cases addressing family matters in 
the immigration context 
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the importance of 
family reunification and has recognized the fundamental rights 
involved in marriage as well as in living with one’s immediate and 
extended family members.  However, when evaluating family matters 
in the context of immigration laws, the Court and some circuit courts 
have used disparate language.  For example, in Fiallo v. Bell,196 unwed 
U.S.-citizen fathers challenged the constitutionality of a section of the 
INA preventing them and their illegitimate children from receiving 
the special preferences of “parent” and “child” because it impinged 
on their fundamental right to a “familial relationship.”197  Although 
the Court found that the INA provision implicated the U.S.-citizen 
fathers’ constitutional rights, the Supreme Court ultimately disagreed 
with the U.S.-citizen fathers and applied a limited review.198  The 
Court relied on Mandel’s plenary power reasoning to constrain any 
further review of the fathers’ claims but accepted that the Court had 
“limited judicial responsibility.”199  Justice Marshall, in his forceful 
dissent, declared that the plenary power precedents upon which the 
majority relied were outdated.200  He argued that cases involving 
                                                          
 196. 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 197. See id. at 794 (explaining that the fathers sought to distinguish prior Supreme 
Court immigration opinions from the instant case by arguing that none of the other 
cases dealt with sex discrimination and a child’s illegitimacy or otherwise implicated 
citizens’ and permanent residents’ fundamental rights respecting the family). 
 198. See id. at 792–95 (noting that immigration legislation is subject to limited 
review because the plenary power doctrine suggests that Congress and the executive 
branch have complete control over admission and exclusion decisions). 
 199. Id. at 793 n.5 (“Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial 
responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to 
regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens . . . .”).  But see id. at 794–95 
(reasoning that no reason existed to apply a different standard than that from 
Mandel, where the Court had held that “when the Executive exercises this 
[delegated] power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide 
reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it 
by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek 
personal communication with the applicant” (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 200. See id. at 805–06 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government does 
not have unreviewable discretion and that the “old immigration cases” upon which 
the majority relied “[were] not the strongest precedents in the United States 
Reports” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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family matters are distinguishable from Mandel—which did not 
involve family members—and that these cases deserve more review.201 
The Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit have also emphasized the fundamental right of a U.S. citizen 
to choose in what country to reside.  In Schneider v. Rusk,202 the 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that 
stripped citizenship from a U.S. citizen who had continuously resided 
abroad for three years in her country of birth.203  The Court struck 
down the statute as a violation of the citizen’s due process, reasoning 
that a U.S. citizen has a fundamental right to reside wherever he 
chooses, whether in the United States or abroad.204  Similarly, in 
Acosta v. Gaffney,205 the Third Circuit evaluated whether an infant U.S. 
citizen was entitled to a stay of her parents’ deportation because 
deporting them would deny her the right to reside in the United 
States.206  The Third Circuit held that the district court erred when it 
decided that a stay of deportation would be appropriate.207  The court 
reasoned that a refusal to grant a stay of deportation would not 
violate the infant’s right to choose her residence because, as an 
infant, she could not make a conscious choice about where to live 
and must reside with her parents.208  The court, however, still 
recognized that “[t]he right of an American citizen to fix and change 
his residence is a continuing one which he enjoys throughout his life.”209 
                                                          
 201. Id. at 808–10.  Justice Marshall also distinguished Fiallo from Mandel, arguing 
that unlike in Mandel, the interests involved in Fiallo directly affected U.S.-citizen 
family members.  See id. at 808 (suggesting that Mandel was focused on the 
government’s interest in admitting or not admitting noncitizens whereas the purpose 
of the statutory provision at issue in Fiallo was to give rights to U.S. citizens). 
 202. 377 U.S. 163 (1964). 
 203. Id. at 164. 
 204. Id. at 168–69. 
 205. 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 206. See id. at 1155 (explaining that the infant’s parents, who had added 
themselves as plaintiffs with their daughter, argued that a deportation order or 
denial of stay would destroy their family relationship and deny the U.S.-citizen child 
equal protection because her parents were not U.S. citizens). 
 207. Id. at 1158. 
 208. See id. (finding that an infant is incapable of exercising the “right of choice of 
residence”).  The plaintiffs interpreted the child’s liberty interest as her right to 
reside in her country of birth.  Id. at 1157.  However, the court argued that the 
cognizable liberty interest was even broader, stating that “[i]t is the fundamental 
right of an American citizen to reside wherever he wishes, whether in the United 
States or abroad . . . .”  Id. 
 209. Id. at 1158 (reasoning that the plaintiff will be able to assert her right as soon 
as she reaches the age of “discretion”). 
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The Supreme Court has, in subsequent years, continued to uphold 
familial ties even when an immigration issue was involved.  For 
example, in Landon v. Plasencia,210 the Supreme Court gave 
considerable weight to a noncitizen’s familial ties to the United States 
to grant her more due process protections.211  Mrs. Plasencia, a legal 
permanent resident, left the United States for a few days and was 
caught smuggling noncitizens into the United States.212  The 
Supreme Court held that Mrs. Plasencia was entitled to procedural 
due process protections in an exclusion proceeding as an admitted, 
continuously present resident of the United States.213  The Court 
recognized that the level of process due would vary depending on the 
interests at stake but reasoned that the “right to rejoin her immediate 
family, [is] a right that ranks high among the interests of the 
individual.”214  Thus, in Plasencia, the Court recognized that Mrs. 
Plasencia had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in rejoining 
her family. 
Relatedly, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that a U.S. citizen has a 
liberty interest in remaining in the same country with his or her 
spouse.  In Ching v. Mayorkas,215 a U.S.-citizen spouse who filed a visa 
petition for his noncitizen spouse argued that he had a protected 
liberty interest that was implicated by the denial of his wife’s visa 
petition.216  The Ninth Circuit agreed and applied the Mathews v. 
Eldridge217 balancing test to determine whether the couple had 
received adequate procedural due process protections.218  The 
Mathews balancing test asks courts to consider the individual’s liberty 
interests, the cost to the government of additional due process 
procedures, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the 
individual’s liberty interests as a result of the deficient procedures.219  
In evaluating the first prong of the Mathews test, the court in Ching 
                                                          
 210. 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
 211. See id. at 30–32 (noting that past precedent has held that “a resident alien 
returning from a brief trip has a right to due process just as would a continuously 
present resident alien” and that “once an alien gains admission to our country and 
begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status 
changes accordingly”). 
 212. Id. at 23. 
 213. Id. at 31–33. 
 214. Id. at 34. 
 215. 725 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 216. Id. at 1153. 
 217. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 218. Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157–59. 
 219. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. 
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determined that “[t]he right to marry and to enjoy marriage are 
unquestionably liberty interests protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”220  The court also reasoned that the “right to live with and 
not be separated from one’s immediate family is a ‘right that ranks 
high among the interests of the individual’ and cannot be taken away 
without procedural due process.”221  Thus, the court in Ching 
recognized that spousal separation or a foreign spouse’s imminent 
exclusion from the United States would impose a considerable 
hardship on the fundamental right to enjoy marriage and the right to 
not be separated from close family members.222 
Joining the Second Circuit in Burrafato,223 the D.C. Circuit and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have held that the 
government does not violate a U.S.-citizen spouse’s constitutional 
rights when it denies his or her foreign spouse’s visa because the 
courts have determined that there is no constitutionally protected 
interest implicated by the separation or exclusion of a noncitizen 
family member as a result of a visa denial.224  In Swartz v. Rogers,225 the 
D.C. Circuit held that the deportation of the foreign spouse of a U.S. 
citizen did not impinge on that U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights.226  
The court stated, “[D]eportation would not in any way destroy the 
legal union which the marriage created.  The physical conditions of 
the marriage may change, but the marriage continues.”227  In Almario 
v. Attorney General,228 the Sixth Circuit considered the constitutionality 
of an immigration statute that imposed a two-year foreign residence 
requirement for noncitizens who are in deportation proceedings and 
marry a U.S. citizen.229  The court held that the statute was valid and 
                                                          
 220. See Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157 (indicating that protected liberty interests include 
“the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children” 
(quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))). 
 221. Id. (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982)) (arguing that the 
first prong of the Mathews test favors the plaintiffs). 
 222. See id. at 1157–59 (remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing because two 
parts of the Mathews test weighed in the petitioners’ favor). 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 119–24 (discussing the Second Circuit’s 
denial of jurisdiction to review a visa denial in Burrafato). 
 224. See, e.g., Almario v. Attorney Gen., 872 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989); Swartz v. 
Rogers, 254 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
 225. 254 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
 226. Id. at 339. 
 227. Id. 
 228. 872 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 229. Id. at 149. 
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reasoned that the U.S. citizen did not have a right to have his or her 
noncitizen spouse remain in the United States.230 
The decisions from the Second, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits are in 
conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s decisions and the long-established 
Supreme Court precedent, which provides that the rights to enter 
and maintain a marital relationship and the rights to live with, rejoin, 
and remain with family members are fundamental liberty interests 
that require procedural due process protections. 
II. THE DENIAL OF AN IMMEDIATE RELATIVE OR FAMILY-SPONSORED 
VISA OF A U.S. CITIZEN’S FAMILY MEMBER IMPLICATES THAT U.S. 
CITIZEN’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, THEREBY ALLOWING AN 
OPPORTUNITY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The Supreme Court has carved out an exception to consular 
nonreviewability.  This exception allows federal courts to apply a 
limited review of a visa denial when the visa denial implicates the First 
Amendment rights of a U.S. citizen.  Scholars have recognized that 
Mandel provides a weak test because the Court offered unclear 
reasoning and poor guidance for how subsequent courts should 
interpret the decision.231  Since first recognizing this exception in 
Mandel, federal courts have continued to expand review—first, by 
extending the grounds covered by Mandel, and second, by 
recognizing that some claims beyond the First Amendment may 
trigger judicial review.232  The Supreme Court has not addressed 
consular nonreviewability since its decision in Mandel in 1972, and 
several federal courts of appeals are in conflict about which rights 
                                                          
 230. Id. at 151; see also Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 496 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(discussing Almario and again refusing to agree with a plaintiff’s characterization of 
the fundamental right implicated by the denial of an immediate relative petition).  
In Bangura, the Sixth Circuit found that a denial of an immediate relative visa does 
not infringe upon the right to marry and further stated that a U.S. citizen does not 
have a right to have his or her noncitizen spouse remain in the country.  Id. 
 231. See Nafziger, supra note 16, at 75 (“The intended scope of the Mandel test of 
a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason’ for an immigration decision is anything 
but clear.”). 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 110–17 (discussing cases extending Mandel 
to U.S. citizens claiming that denial impinges on their fundamental rights to 
marriage and concerning family relations); see also Donald S. Dobkin, Challenging the 
Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability in Immigration Cases, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 113, 130–
31 (2010) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s holding in Mandel for not providing 
plaintiffs with guidance about which type of due process violation they must assert to 
be eligible for Mandel review). 
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trigger Mandel review.233  Subpart A, below, analyzes the First, Second, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits’ interpretations of Mandel review.  Applying 
the Supreme Court’s precedents recognizing marriage as a 
fundamental right, subpart B argues that federal courts should 
extend Mandel review to claims by U.S. citizens married to foreign 
spouses.  Finally, subpart C applies the Supreme Court’s precedents 
establishing that families have a right to live together and argues that 
federal courts should extend Mandel review to all immediate relative 
and family-sponsored visa denials. 
A. The First, Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits Broadly Interpret when 
Mandel Review Applies 
The Supreme Court in Mandel failed to specify when Mandel review 
would apply.234  As a result, over the past four decades, federal courts 
have interpreted Mandel to fill the Court’s void.235  Although Mandel 
involved a visa waiver denial, federal courts have expanded the 
application of Mandel review to include visa denials involving U.S. 
citizens’ First Amendment and Fifth Amendment due process 
rights.236  Following the First, Second, and D.C. Circuits, which apply 
a broad interpretation of Mandel’s original holding, the Ninth Circuit 
in Bustamante and Din correctly found that Mandel review extends to a 
                                                          
 233. See Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d 1212, 1214 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) 
(referring to Mandel and holding that a Filipino citizen’s nonimmigrant visa was not 
subject to judicial review); Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 556–57 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (refusing to review a foreign spouse’s visa, citing Mandel). 
 234. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (“What First Amendment 
or other grounds may be available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no 
justification whatsoever is advanced is a question we neither address or decide in this 
case.”).  Compare Burrafato, 523 F.2d at 554 (declining to hold that a U.S. citizen’s 
fundamental rights to marriage or to live with her spouse triggers Mandel review), 
with Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a U.S. 
citizen’s fundamental rights to marriage and in family relations are implicated when 
a consular officer denies her foreign spouse’s visa and that the decision is entitled to 
judicial review). 
 235. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 124–25 (2d Cir. 
2009) (expanding Mandel to include visa denials and not only visa waiver denials); 
Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647–48 (1st Cir. 1990) (choosing to apply Mandel 
review only in instances of “clear error” and without a “facially legitimate and bona 
fide reason” for such a denial (internal quotation marks omitted)); Abourezk v. Reagan, 
785 F.2d 1043, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam). 
 236. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 
(2014); Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1061–62; Baker, 909 F.2d at 645; Allende v. Shultz, 
845 F.2d 1111, 1116 (1st Cir. 1988); Burrafato, 523 F.2d at 555; see also Delgado, supra 
note 53, at 66–67 (stating that the “practical effect of [Bustamante and American 
Academy is] an abandonment of the doctrine of consular absolutism”). 
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visa denial that implicates a U.S. citizen’s protected liberty interests in 
marriage and family life.237  When the Supreme Court decides Din, it 
should follow these four courts of appeals, which allow a limited 
judicial of review a U.S.-citizen spouse’s or family member’s denied visa. 
The First, Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have broadly applied 
Mandel—first, by extending Mandel review to visa denials (rather than 
limiting review only to visa waiver denials as in Mandel), and second, 
by not explicitly limiting the scope of Mandel to only U.S. citizens’ 
First Amendment claims.238  In Bruno, the D.C. Circuit broadly 
interpreted Mandel as holding that review applies when a U.S. citizen 
asserts a violation of his or her constitutional rights as a result of the 
noncitizen’s visa denial.239  The D.C. Circuit did not limit its 
interpretation of Mandel to U.S. citizens raising First Amendment 
claims.240  Although the court ultimately found that the U.S.-citizen 
petitioners lacked standing because they did not assert a 
constitutional violation as a result of the noncitizen’s visa denial,241 its 
decision suggests that if the petitioners had asserted a valid violation 
of a fundamental right, the D.C. Circuit would have reviewed the 
noncitizen’s visa denial. 
The First and Second Circuits reached similar conclusions in Baker 
and Burrafato, respectively.242  Although Baker involved only First 
                                                          
 237. See Din, 718 F.3d at 860 (“Since Mandel, our Court and several of our sister 
circuits have exercised jurisdiction over citizens’ challenges to visa denials that 
implicate the citizens’ constitutional rights.”); Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1062 (“Joining 
the First, Second, and D.C. Circuits, we hold that under Mandel, a U.S. citizen raising 
a constitutional challenge to the denial of a visa is entitled to a limited judicial 
inquiry regarding the reason for the decision.”). 
 238. See cases cited supra note 237; see also Burt Neuborne & Steven R Shapiro, 
The Nylon Curtain:  America’s National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 719, 750–52 (1985) (suggesting that some lower courts have interpreted 
Mandel liberally). 
 239. See Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(interpreting Abourezk to hold that when a U.S.-citizen visa petitioner asserts a 
violation of his or her constitutional rights as a result of the Department of State’s 
visa denial, judicial review is “proper”). 
 240. See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417, 428 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(interpreting Mandel as requiring the government to show a “facially legitimate 
and bona fide reason” for a visa refusal when there is a constitutionally protected 
interest involved). 
 241. See Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1163–64 (“Unlike Abourezk, Saavedra’s 
American sponsors . . . asserted no constitutional claims.  Furthermore, in our view, 
[Saavedra’s American sponsors do not] have standing to challenge the denial . . . .”). 
 242.  Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 650 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that there was in 
fact a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for denying the visa application at 
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Amendment rights of U.S. citizens,243 the court expressly stated that 
immigration decisions “based upon constitutional rights and interests of 
United States citizens” were at least subject to limited review.244  In 
doing so, the court implicitly rejected the notion that First 
Amendment claims are the only constitutional claims that allow for 
Mandel review.  Likewise, the Second Circuit in Burrafato did not limit 
Mandel’s holding to only First Amendment claims.  Rather, the court 
denied review in that case because of Second Circuit precedent that 
visa denials do not implicate spousal rights to marriage.245 
In American Academy, the Second Circuit extended Mandel review to 
U.S. citizens asserting First Amendment claims over a consular 
officer’s visa denial.246  The Second Circuit, following the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Bustamante, rejected the government’s claim that 
Mandel review applies only to visa waivers and interpreted Mandel 
review as applying to a consular officer’s visa denial where a U.S. 
citizen asserts a constitutional claim.247  The Second Circuit 
distinguished Burrafato by stating that the court in that case did not 
reach the question of whether Mandel applied to visa denials 
because it found that the U.S.-citizen spouse lacked standing to 
assert her claim.248 
In Bustamante, the Ninth Circuit became the first court of appeals 
to declare that a non-First Amendment claim can trigger Mandel 
review.  Relying on First, Second, and D.C. Circuit precedent, the 
court interpreted Mandel’s holding to apply where a visa denial 
implicates any U.S. citizen’s constitutionally protected interests.249  
                                                          
issue); Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1975) (concluding 
the nonresident did not have standing to bring a claim in federal court). 
 243. Baker, 909 F.2d at 647. 
 244. Id. (emphasis added). 
 245. See Burrafato, 523 F.2d at 555 (explaining that the court precedent 
“foreclosed” the decision in the instant case). 
 246. Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We 
conclude that, where a plaintiff, with standing to do so, asserts a First Amendment 
claim to have a visa applicant present views in this country, we should apply Mandel to 
a consular officer’s denial of a visa.”); see also Margaret Laufman, Comment, 
American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1173, 1175 
(2011) (arguing that the Second Circuit’s decision in American Academy “could 
provide the basis for courts to recognize a broader exception that would allow 
judicial review of visa denials that implicate any constitutional interest of U.S. citizens”). 
 247. See Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 124 (adding that “[t]he case law in the 
aftermath of Mandel favors such review”). 
 248. See id. at 124–25 (asserting that the Second Circuit has not addressed the 
question of whether Mandel review applies to visa denials). 
 249. Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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The court correctly relied on Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, a 
substantive due process case recognizing the freedom of personal 
choice in marriage and family life, to find that a consular officer’s visa 
denial implicated the U.S. citizen’s liberty interest in her marriage 
and, thus, triggered Mandel review.250  Other federal courts have 
critiqued the Bustamante court for accepting the U.S. citizen’s 
assertion of her liberty interest at face value.251  This characterization 
of Bustamante is incorrect because the Ninth Circuit correctly relied 
on Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,252 a Supreme Court 
procedural due process decision, and held that “the Due Process 
Clause provides that certain substantive rightslife, liberty, and 
propertycannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally 
adequate procedures.”253  In Din, decided five years after Bustamante, 
the Ninth Circuit appropriately rejected the government’s argument 
that Bustamante was not good law because it was in conflict with D.C. 
                                                          
 250. See id. at 1062 (“Freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and 
family life is, of course, one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause.” 
(citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–640 (1974))). 
 251. See, e.g., Jathoul v. Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172 (D.D.C. 2012) (alleging 
that Bustamante does not apply because the Ninth Circuit in that case did not explain 
why the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were actually implicated); Udugampola v. 
Jacobs, 795 F. Supp. 2d 96, 105–06 (D.D.C.) (stating that the physical separation of 
deportation does not diminish the constitutional right to marriage), appeal dismissed, 
No. 11-5215, 2011 WL 5903822 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 17, 2011).  Despite these arguments, 
the court in Bustamante may have implicitly deemed unwarranted any explanation of 
why a U.S.-citizen spouse had a liberty interest in her marriage because it may have 
determined the existence of that liberty interest incontrovertible.  The issue is not 
necessarily that the constitutional right is diminished, as the court in Udugampola 
argues, but rather that the government action impinges on the U.S. citizen’s ability 
to consummate a marriage or reside in the same home as her foreign spouse.  The 
U.S.-citizen petitioner’s point is not that her right to marriage or to raise a family 
absolves as a result of the visa denial but that a visa denial could severely affect the 
result of the marriage, and because of that, some procedural protections should exist, 
even if a court ultimately determines that all the process due is a facially legitimate 
and bona fide reason. 
 252. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
 253. See Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1062 (alteration in original) (quoting Loudermill, 
470 U.S. at 541).  In Loudermill, the Supreme Court determined that public 
employees who were terminated had a property interest in their employment and, 
thus, that they could not be terminated without the opportunity for a hearing or 
notice and an opportunity to respond.  See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.  The plaintiffs 
in Bustamante similarly raised a procedural due process claim, and the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Loudermill—which provides that 
when a liberty or property interest is at stake, some procedural protections should 
exist—also applied in the instant case.  Bustamante, 431 F.3d at 106. 
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and Second Circuit precedent.254  The court in Din accurately 
asserted that a U.S.-citizen spouse’s right to review is grounded in a 
broader right to “[f]reedom of personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family life.”255 
Despite refusing to strike down the doctrine of consular 
nonreviewability, the Supreme Court in Mandel signaled that a 
consular officer’s decision was not absolute by allowing some review of 
a consular officer’s decision when the denial implicated the First 
Amendment rights of the U.S.-citizen professors involved in the 
case.256  The decisions from the First, Second, Ninth, and D.C. 
Circuits demonstrate how federal courts have correctly interpreted 
Mandel to expand access to judicial review overall.  By reviewing a 
consular officer’s visa denial and not solely a visa waiver denial, these 
federal courts have expanded the grounds under which Mandel 
review applies.  The First, Second, and D.C. Circuits’ readiness to 
recognize a role for the judiciary in consular decisions where the 
constitutional interests of a U.S. citizen are at stake—beyond First 
Amendment claims—paved the way for the Ninth Circuit’s decisions 
in Bustamante and Din. 
Together, these cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court should 
not limit Mandel to First Amendment claims when other types of 
fundamental rights—such as the right to marriage, to raise a family, 
and the right to live with one’s extended family members—are 
equally important.  The court in Bustamante appropriately recognized 
that there are higher stakes involved when a consular officer’s 
decision threatens a U.S. citizen’s marriage.  Moreover, Bustamante 
demonstrates that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not 
rigorously bind federal courts as it did in the 1970s when the 
Supreme Court initially decided Mandel and Burrafato.  The lower 
courts’ perpetual acknowledgment of some judicial responsibility over 
consular decisions, combined with decades of Supreme Court 
precedent guaranteeing the fundamental rights associated with 
marriage, raising a family, and living together as a family 
demonstrates that U.S. citizens should have an avenue for formal—
                                                          
 254. See Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 860 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissing the 
government’s articulation of the liberty interest at stake in Bustamante), cert. granted, 
135 S. Ct. 44 (2014). 
 255. See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1062) 
(stressing that the liberty interest in Bustamante should not be interpreted as “the 
ability to live in the United State with an alien spouse”). 
 256. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). 
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even if limited—judicial review of their spouse’s or immediate family 
member’s visa denial. 
B.  A U.S. Citizen’s Rights Are Implicated by the Denial of His or Her 
Spouse’s Visa 
In Mandel, the U.S.-citizen professors alleged that Mr. Mandel’s 
exclusion violated their First Amendment right of free speech and 
their Fifth Amendment due process rights.  Neither the Supreme 
Court nor the lower court specifically addressed whether their 
holdings included all constitutionally protected rights (thereby 
triggering Fifth Amendment protections) or whether their holdings 
merely addressed the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.  This 
ambiguity has contributed to federal courts’ divergent applications of 
Mandel review.  Thus, courts are in conflict about whether a visa 
denial impinges on a U.S.-citizen plaintiff’s rights to marry and to 
raise a family and thus about whether a U.S. citizen can assert a Fifth 
Amendment due process violation claim as a result of the denial. 
The Supreme Court should follow the Ninth Circuit and extend 
Mandel review to claims by U.S.-citizen spouses because the Supreme 
Court has long recognized marriage as a fundamental right and has 
held that government intrusions on an individual’s ability to enter 
into, preserve, or dissolve a marriage deserve judicial protection and 
constitutionally adequate procedures.  When a consular officer 
denies a foreign spouse’s visa, the consular officer could prevent a 
U.S.-citizen spouse from consummating his or her marriage, 
establishing a home, and raising a unified family.  While the denial of 
a visa may not prevent a couple from legally “entering” into a 
marriage, establishing a home abroad, or raising a child abroad, 
separation does make engaging in these activities together more 
difficult and could in fact pose a threat to other essential aspects of 
married and family life that the Supreme Court has identified as 
constitutionally protected.  Moreover, even if a foreign family 
member of a U.S. citizen has been deemed a national security risk, 
some information should be revealed either to the foreign national 
or the U.S. citizen to understand the allegations against the individual.257 
                                                          
 257. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2014 WL 
6609111, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014) (stating that government interference with 
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests merits some judicial responsibility, 
but also recognizing that “[d]ue process . . . is a flexible concept that varies with the 
particular situation” (alterations in original) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 
113, 127 (1990))).  Thus, a court could determine that limited protections are due 
because a noncitizen spouse poses a threat to national security. 
BACA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  7:56 PM 
2015] VISA DENIED 635 
When the Supreme Court decided Mandel, the Court had amply 
upheld the liberty interests involved in marriage and family life.  In 
1923, the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska found that the rights to 
marry, to establish a home, and to raise a family were constitutionally 
protected interests.258  The Court recognized that the government 
could not infringe on these liberties in an arbitrary and unreasonable 
manner even if the purpose of the government’s action was to protect 
the public interest.259  By declining a foreign spouse’s visa, a consular 
officer is effectively impeding a U.S. citizen’s opportunity to establish 
a home and raise a family in the United States.  If the denial is based 
on legitimate and judicious reasons, then a U.S. citizen will have to 
bear the results of the denial.  Unfortunately, a consular officer could 
deny a visa based on false information, a mistake, or pretext, and 
neither the U.S.-citizen petitioner nor the visa applicant will have a 
fair opportunity to contest the allegations or appeal the denial.260  
When a denial is based on classified information, as in many no-fly list 
cases, a U.S. citizen, on behalf of his or her spouse, should be given 
the opportunity to review that information—even on a sealed or 
limited basis—to give the U.S. citizen and the applicant an 
opportunity to rebut the allegations against the applicant.261 
There are currently no independent administrative or judicial 
oversight provisions in place to ensure that a consular officer does 
not act arbitrarily or unreasonably.262  As one scholar notes, this raw, 
absolute power raises the potential for abuse, particularly in the wake 
of September 11th, when administrative officials, especially those 
charged with immigration duties, are responsible for guarding the 
country against terrorist threats.263  The Court in Meyer specifically 
                                                          
 258. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 259. Id. at 399–400. 
 260. See Zas, supra note 17, at 587–88 (explaining that the doctrine of consular 
nonreviewability applies “even if the consul acts capriciously, arbitrarily, or maliciously”). 
 261. Cf. Ibrahim, 2014 WL 6609111, at *19–21 (denying challenges to visa denials 
under the state secrets privilege but concluding that a consular officer erred in not 
advising the noncitizen applicant of her right to apply for a waiver).  In Ibrahim, the 
court stated that when an executive branch official makes a “reviewable, concrete 
adverse action” or a nondiscretionary action, then a court would be able to 
adjudicate the extent to which it could provide the plaintiff access—in a sealed or 
classified manner—to the information that exists against her.  Id. at *21.  However, 
the court determined that a decision on a visa denial is unreviewable.  Id. 
 262. See Zas, supra note 17, at 588 (disparaging the absolute power granted to 
consular officers).  See generally Nafziger, supra note 16, at 16–25, 95–102 (analyzing 
existing visa review procedures and proposing a new review mechanism). 
 263. See Zas, supra note 17, at 589 nn.98–99 (highlighting Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence in Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1948), which 
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cautioned that government actions could not infringe on the liberties 
to establish a home and raise a family even under the pretense of 
protecting the public interest.264  Relatedly, the Court in Skinner, in 
striking a down a forced sterilization law, reasoned that public safety 
was not a compelling reason to limit even the “most elementary 
notions of due process.”265  Therefore, absent a countervailing 
national interest and even given the heightened responsibilities of 
consular officials aimed at protecting national security, consular 
officers should not have absolute power to dictate the private lives of 
U.S. citizens with strong ties to foreign nationals.266 
The D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Swartz, the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Burrafato, and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Almario 
misconstrue the rights implicated by the removal or exclusion of a 
foreign spouse.  These circuits interpret the U.S. citizen’s right as the 
right to have his or her spouse reside or remain in the United States 
or as the right to live in the United States with a foreign spouse.267  
These interpretations are incorrect.  In deciding Din, the Supreme 
Court should not interpret the right at stake as the U.S. citizen’s right 
to have his or her spouse live in the United States as the Sixth Circuit 
did in Almario, nor should it brazenly disregard the constitutionally 
protected interests implicated by a family member’s exclusion or 
removal from the United States, as the Second Circuit did in 
Burrafato. 268  Rather, the Supreme Court should interpret the right at 
                                                          
cautioned against “decisions made in the heat of a war atmosphere because patriotic 
fervor makes moderation unpopular”). 
 264. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399–400 (stating that courts have the responsibility and 
authority to evaluate a legislature’s determination of the scope of the police power). 
 265. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 545 (1942) (Stone, J., concurring) 
(conceding that the government may need to occasionally act to protect the public 
interest but should still protect an individual’s liberty interests as well). 
 266. See Zas, supra note 17, at 589 (intimating that low ranking consular officials 
may be “negatively influence[d]” by national security prerogatives and may have 
“more incentives to deny, rather than issue a visa”). 
 267. See Almario v. Att’y Gen., 872 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a 
U.S. citizen does not have a right to have her alien spouse reside in the U.S.); 
Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming the 
rule in the circuit that citizens do not have a constitutional right that is infringed 
when his or her alien spouse is deported); Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338, 339 
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (same). 
 268.  See Almario, 872 F.2d at 151 (citing Burrafato, 523 F.2d at 555) (declaring that 
a U.S. citizen lacks a right to have a foreign spouse remain in the United States); 
Burrafato 523 F.2d at 555–57 (citing Swartz, 254 F.2d 338) (stating that a U.S. citizen’s 
constitutional rights are not violated by the removal of her spouse).  These cases 
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stake as the U.S. citizen’s right to marry an individual of his or her 
choice, to preserve his or her marriage, and to raise a family.  The 
Supreme Court should instead affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Din, which noted that the U.S. citizen’s right is predicated on a more 
general right to “[f]reedom of personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life.”269  This reasoning parallels the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Griswold, which acknowledged that private marital 
decisions are entitled to constitutional protection.270  In Swartz, the 
decision on which Almario and Burrafato rely, the D.C. Circuit 
reasoned that removal of a foreign spouse from the United States 
would not in any way interfere with the couple’s ability to enter into 
or remain in a legal union.271  While that may be true, the Supreme 
Court in Griswold interpreted the fundamental right to marriage 
more broadly:  the Court held that there is a fundamental right to 
decisions made while married and not merely a fundamental right to 
entering into a marriage.272 Thus, the Supreme Court has determined 
that government actions infringing on decisions made while married 
or that affect elements of married and family life are constitutionally 
protected.  Those decisions may become more unstable when the 
government action—perhaps without a proffered reason—separates a 
couple across borders. 
After Mandel, the Supreme Court continued to afford even greater 
protections to an individual’s decisions involving marriage and family 
matters.  In 1974, the Court in LaFleur affirmed decades of Supreme 
                                                          
offer weak precedents.  Almario, more recently decided, relies on Burrafato, which 
relies on Swartz, a case decided fourteen years before Mandel. 
 269. See Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 860 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008)) (rebutting the 
government’s argument that Bustamante provides an alien spouse with a right to live 
in the U.S.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014); see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“Appropriate limits on substantive due 
process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful respect for the 
teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our 
society.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 270. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (“Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from 
the sanctity of property rights.  The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of 
family life.  And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been 
found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted 
Constitutional right. . . .  Of this whole private realm of family life it is difficult to imagine 
what is more private or more intimate than a husband and wife’s marital relations.” 
(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551–52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
 271. Swartz, 254 F.3d at 339. 
 272. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86. 
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Court precedent and recognized a liberty interest in matters related 
to marriage and family life, such as the decision to bear a child.273  
Likewise, in 1978, the Supreme Court in Zablocki broadly interpreted 
the right to marry.274  The Court equated the right to marry with 
bearing and raising children and maintaining family relationships 
and held that governmental decisions that unreasonably interfere 
with these rights deserve scrutiny because these relationships are the 
foundation of U.S. society.275  More recently, in 2013 in Windsor, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that there are “mundane [and] 
profound” elements of married and family life that should not be 
burdened.276  The Court further suggested that “diminishing the 
stability and predictability of basic personal relations [such as 
marriage]” erodes the significance of those institutions.277  These 
decisions demonstrate that the Supreme Court has broadly 
interpreted the fundamental right to marriage and family life to 
encompass those choices made within the marriage, those involved 
with entering or dissolving a marriage, and those involved with 
bearing and raising children. 
A consular officer’s decision would undoubtedly impinge on the 
foregoing choices.  Beyond preventing a U.S. citizen from residing in 
the United States with her foreign spouse, an unfounded, erroneous, 
or pretextual visa denial would compromise a U.S. citizen’s decisions 
about bearing and raising children as well as other intimate familial 
and marital decisions.  While these decisions can still be made across 
borders, the separation of two individuals who are unable to make 
both mundane and profound decisions in person makes the 
discussions, decisions, and the process of raising a family far more 
difficult.  The preceding cases highlight the constitutional 
                                                          
 273. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974). 
 274. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (striking down a state statute 
that required noncustodial parents to pay past due child support payments before 
the noncustodial parents could obtain a marriage license). 
 275. Id. at 386; see also LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639 (rejecting a school board’s policy 
requiring pregnant teachers to take maternity leave during the final months of 
pregnancy because it overly burdened the teachers’ freedom of choice in marriage 
and family decisions). 
 276. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013) (listing some 
benefits of married life such as those available for healthcare purposes and 
responsibilities such as supporting each other during educational endeavors). 
 277.  See id. at 2694 (stating that DOMA produces an unpredictable 
“differentiation” for same-sex married couples—where their marriage is recognized 
by a state, but not by the federal government—that derogates the choices the 
Constitution is designed to protect). 
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protections afforded to couples and the family, and these protections 
should not yield to the plenary power doctrine merely because 
immigration law governs the foreign spouse’s ability to reside within 
the United States.278  As Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan 
forcefully articulated in their dissent in Mandel, the line of cases 
supporting the plenary power doctrine did not implicate U.S. 
citizens’ rights.279  Those decisions, dealing exclusively with the rights 
of noncitizens, now encourage absolute discretion by consular 
officers and prevent federal courts from engaging in review when a 
visa denial clearly implicates the rights of a U.S. citizen.  This 
approach is contradictory to longstanding Supreme Court precedent 
and the Supreme Court should no longer follow such precedent. 
C.   A U.S. Citizen’s Rights Are Implicated by the Denial of His or Her 
Immediate or Extended Family Member’s Visa 
For decades the Supreme Court has supported the fundamental 
right of family members to live with each other, much like it has 
protected individuals’ fundamental right to marriage.  In 2013, the 
Ninth Circuit, citing to Landon v. Plasencia, correctly stated that the 
“right to live with and not be separated from one’s immediate family 
is ‘a right that ranks high among the interests of the individual’ and 
that cannot be taken away without procedural due process.”280  The 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of this right accurately applies the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Moore v. City of East Cleveland and 
Landon v. Plasencia, which recognize that a U.S. citizen has a 
fundamental right to live with extended family members and which 
implicitly recognize that separation from or the inability to rejoin 
                                                          
 278. See Cox, supra note 59, at 391–92 (“Immigration law regularly injures citizens 
by expelling or excluding people with whom citizens associate. . . .  [A]ssociational 
interests represent one well-established interest of American citizens that 
immigration policy can affect in legally cognizable ways.”). 
 279. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 782 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the plenary power precedents upon which the Mandel majority relied 
were distinguishable from Mandel because none of those cases involved the rights of 
U.S. citizens).  Justice Marshall further emphasized that where “the rights of 
Americans are involved, there is no basis for concluding that the power to 
exclude . . . is absolute.”  Id. at 282–83 (adding that the courts should not “blindly 
defer” to the legislative and executive branches when personal liberty is at issue”). 
 280. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 215–22 (discussing Ching, where the court, applying the Mathews v. Eldridge 
balancing test, reasoned that the U.S.-citizen spouse had a substantial interest at 
stake in remaining with his foreign-citizen wife). 
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family members infringes on such right.281  When the Supreme Court 
considers whether a U.S. citizen’s rights are implicated by the denial 
of his or her family member’s visa, it should follow its reasoning in 
Moore and Plasencia as well as the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Ching.  
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Swartz and the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Burrafato are not reliable precedents:  the D.C. Circuit 
decided Swartz before the Supreme Court decided Mandel, and the 
Second Circuit decided Burrafato before the Supreme Court had 
developed its jurisprudence declaring that marriage, decisions made 
while married, and decisions to raise a family are constitutionally 
protected interests.  For the reasons that follow, the Supreme Court 
should acknowledge that a U.S. citizen has a constitutionally 
protected interest in living, reuniting with, and not being separated 
from foreign family members. 
First, courts have consistently found that separation from family 
members can result in a legally cognizable injury.  In Fiallo, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the INA’s classification of “parent” 
and “child” that prevented U.S.-citizen fathers from claiming their 
illegitimate children as a “child” for purposes of a visa petition 
impinged on the U.S. citizen’s rights.282  Although the Court 
ultimately applied a limited rational basis review to uphold the INA’s 
classification, the Court nonetheless recognized that the U.S. citizen’s 
rights were implicated such that they had standing to seek some 
review.283  This is precisely what the Court did in Mandel:  the Court 
recognized that the noncitizen visa beneficiary lacked standing but 
that because U.S. citizens’ rights were implicated, the U.S.-citizen 
petitioners could, in fact, seek some review over the noncitizen’s visa 
waiver denial.284  A citizen’s constitutionally protected interest in 
remaining with a family member, therefore, should not be insulated 
                                                          
 281. Compare Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (citing Moore and finding that Mrs. Plasencia 
had a right to rejoin her immediate family), with Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 
1157 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing Plasencia and identifying this right as “the right to live 
with and not be separated from one’s immediate family” (emphasis added)). 
 282. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 788–90, 794–95 (1977) (granting standing to 
U.S.-citizen fathers). 
 283. See id. at 795 (referring to Mandel, the Court held that there was a limited role 
for judicial scrutiny in congressional and executive decisions related to immigration law). 
 284. See Cox, supra note 59, at 412–16 (describing the cases in which citizens have 
asserted constitutional challenges against immigration laws). 
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from constitutional scrutiny merely because the immigration action 
targets the noncitizen.285 
Second, as noted in the preceding section, the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Swartz is not reliable precedent.  The court in Swartz 
argued that deportation did not affect a U.S.-citizen wife’s 
constitutional rights because spousal separation did not destroy the 
legal basis of a marriage but only affected the physical conditions of 
the marriage.286  This reasoning is contradictory to the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Moore and Mandel.  In Moore, the Supreme Court 
recognized that government interference with the physical conditions 
of family relations, such as restrictions on living arrangements, 
impinges on an individual’s fundamental rights.287  In these instances, 
the Court in Moore argued that “the usual judicial deference to the 
legislature is inappropriate.”288  Analogously, in Mandel, the 
government stressed to the Court that the U.S. citizens’ First 
Amendment rights were not implicated because the professors would 
still have access to Mr. Mandel’s views in other media forms.289  The 
government urged the Court to disregard the physical separation that 
would result from the professor’s visa waiver denial.290  The Court 
flatly rejected the government’s argument, finding that there are 
“particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face-debate, 
discussion and questioning.”291  Thus, the Court in Mandel recognized 
that the physical separation of the U.S.-citizen petitioners and the 
foreign visa applicant burdened the U.S. citizens’ constitutionally 
protected interests. 
A consular officer’s visa denial would instantly prevent a U.S. 
citizen and a foreign family member from living together.  Although 
this may be temporary, the result may be permanent if the visa is 
ultimately never approved, such as when a consular officer finds that 
there is an alleged terrorism-related ground of inadmissibility that 
                                                          
 285. Id. at 390–91, 412 (finding that courts have regularly recognized that immigration 
laws can interfere with a U.S. citizen’s legally cognizable rights and stressing that 
immigration decisions should not be sequestered from constitutional adherence). 
 286. See Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (rationalizing that 
the marriage itself would continue even though the noncitizen spouse would not 
live in the U.S.). 
 287. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499–501 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 288. Id. at 499. 
 289. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). 
 290. Id. 
 291. See id. (adding that the Court was unwilling to hold that the existence of 
alternative means of access to Mandel’s teachings was sufficient to overcome the U.S. 
citizens’ First Amendment rights to hear him speak in person). 
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applies.  The U.S. citizen is then either forced to leave the United 
States to live with her foreign family members abroad or to live 
without them in the United States, a result that could lead to 
economic and emotional hardship for the U.S. citizen.  As mentioned 
in the previous section, if the visa denial is a result of a judicious and 
reasonable government action, then the U.S. citizen will have to bear 
the consequences.  If, however, the visa denial is based on frivolous or 
erroneous facts, then the current system does not allow for any form 
of independent review, and the U.S. citizen may be arbitrarily 
deprived of a long protected liberty interest.  The Supreme Court in 
Moore and Mandel, in contrast to the D.C. Circuit in Swartz, 
recognized that physical separation burdens a U.S. citizen’s 
constitutionally protected interest, even if the legal relationship 
between the parties remained unchanged. 
Third, substantive and procedural due process protections have 
greatly expanded since the D.C. Circuit decided Swartz in 1958 and 
the Second Circuit decided Burrafato in 1975.  Notably, the Supreme 
Court decided Moore and subsequent cases recognizing that family 
members have a fundamental right to live with each other nearly two 
decades after Swartz.292  Even more important, at the time of Swartz, 
the Court had not decided Mandel, but federal courts have continued 
to cite Swartz as if it were binding authority on review of visa denials.  
Additionally, the Second Circuit decided Burrafato, another case 
courts rely on to decline foreign spouses and family members review 
of a visa denials, only three years after Mandel.293  At that time, few 
courts had applied Mandel. 
CONCLUSION 
By denying a U.S. citizen’s spouse’s or family member’s visa, a 
single consular officer can force a U.S. citizen to live without this 
family member or force the U.S. citizen to abdicate his or her life in 
the United States to live with this family member abroad.  As a result 
of the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, a U.S. citizen does not 
have an avenue to seek independent review of this denial.  In Mandel, 
the Supreme Court carved out an exception to consular nonreviewability 
when it granted U.S. citizens standing to assert a constitutional claim 
                                                          
 292. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that courts must 
carefully evaluate the importance of a governmental interest when the government’s 
action intrudes on familial living decisions). 
 293. See Laufman, supra note 247, at 1187 n.120 (adding that substantive due 
process was a new concept when the Second Circuit decided Burrafato). 
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against an immigration official’s action.  By identifying this 
exception, the Court implicitly asserted that a consular officer’s 
decision is not wholly immune from a constitutional challenge.  
Although the Court provided little guidance about the breadth of its 
decision, over the past four decades, federal courts have interpreted 
and altered the Mandel test to fill the Court’s void. 
The Ninth Circuit in Bustamante and Din provides sound 
guidance for federal courts reviewing a visa denial of a U.S. 
citizen’s family member.  Implicitly acknowledging the increasing 
interconnectedness of people across borders and the burdens familial 
separation places on a U.S. citizen while explicitly identifying a U.S. 
citizen’s fundamental right to personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life, the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that the denial 
of a foreign spouse’s visa merits more review.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Bustamante and Din is buttressed by decades of Supreme 
Court precedent protecting married couples and families.  The First, 
Second, and D.C. Circuits’ decisions finding that Mandel review 
applies when a visa denial implicates a U.S. citizen’s constitutional 
rights also support a broader interpretation of Mandel. 
When a visa denial implicates a U.S. citizen’s fundamental right to 
marriage or family life, as in the case of immediate relative and 
family-sponsored immigrant visas, a limited judicial review of visa 
denials should apply.  Extending judicial review to all visa applicants 
is inefficient and contrary to long-established precedent limiting the 
protections afforded to noncitizens seeking admission into the 
United States.  Review of immediate relative and family-sponsored 
immigrant visas, moreover, does not mean that a visa applicant is 
entitled to enter the United States or that a U.S. citizen has a right to 
have his or her spouse enter the United States.  Review of these visas 
merely allows a U.S.-citizen petitioner to receive the due process 
protections that the Supreme Court has recognized exist when a 
government action infringes on the fundamental rights of a U.S. 
citizen.  Longstanding Supreme Court decisions have affirmed the 
traditional role the family plays in U.S. society, and these decisions 
have protected against unwarranted government actions that burden 
individual decisions involving marriage and family matters.  The 
Supreme Court should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead and permit 
Mandel review for immediate relative and family-sponsored visa 
denials.  In these visa denials, a U.S. citizen has substantial interests at 
stake, and courts should grant that U.S. citizen as much or more 
review than U.S.-citizen professors who wish to invite a foreign 
speaker to a conference in the United States. 
